



and the Mendoza (Argentina) - Los Andes (Chile) Transportation Corridor
By
TIM KOEHNE
Bachelor of Science in Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy of Science
University of St. Andrews, Scotland
Submitted to the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in Civil and Environmental Engineering
at the
Massachussetts Institute of Technology
September 1996
Copyright Tim Koehne. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute





Depgftnent of Civil and Environmental Engineering
-- -- - -- • • '--
SJoseph M. Sussman
JR East Professor
0P/ ssor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
---- ~-r r-I
Joseph M. Sussman
Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
(1:





and the Mendoza (Argentina) - Los Andes (Chile) Transportation Corridor
By
TIM KOEHNE
Submitted to the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
on September 17, 1996,
in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of
Master of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering
ABSTRACT
An evaluation framework for projects in general and transportation infrastructure projects
in particular is developed. The focus is on deriving concrete decision criteria based on
first principles and minimizing forecasting required. Arguments are derived from finance
theory, economics, organization theory and the cognitive sciences. The current trend of
providing transportation infrastructure projects privately is questioned. It is shown that
under certain and prevalent conditions, governments ought not perceive riskiness of
outcomes as a cost.
The framework is applied to a proposed 26 km tunnel through the Andes, improving the
transportation corridor Mendoza (Argentina) - Los Andes (Chile), which is part of the so-
called Bi-Oceanic Corridor connecting Buenos Aires and Santiago (de Chile). Interest in
this project has recently increased as Chile has joined the Mercosur trade alliance. The
analysis is largely based on an extensive feasibility study. Six technological options for the
tunnel are considered. Based on the available information the optimal technology is
determined and scenarios for optimal timing are developed. As starting construction is
found to be economically promising in the short term, it is argued that further research
into technology for and demand of the transportation corridor is indicated and that a
yearly analysis ought to be conducted.
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INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This year Chile has joined Argentina. Brazil and other South American countries in the
common market referred to as Mercosur. The degree of integration in Mercosur as yet
falls considerably short of, for instance, the European Union. Nevertheless the Mercosur
agreements signal the determination of all members to reduce, and in the longer run
abolish, existing barriers to trade among members and to reduce barriers to trade with
other countries. Considering the protectionist history of South American countries, a
large potential for trade is to be expected. This is particularly the case for trade between
Chile and Argentina, who were at war as recently as 1982.
Trade requires cheap and reliable transportation. The transportation infrastructure
currently in place is not designed to exploit the trade potential created by Mercosur. It is
designed for limited trade as a consequence of restrictive trade policies prevalent until
recently. It follows that the transportation infrastructure needs to be re-designed to
optimally implement the newly created trade potential.
One critical impediment to trade is the poor transportation infrastructure across the Andes
between Argentina and Chile. The major transportation link, via a mountain pass at an
altitude of 3185 m, has low capacity due to large gradients and hairpin curves; it is
frequently closed during the winter. In particular, this means that the main transportation
link between the capitals and economic centres of Argentina and Chile, Buenos Aires and
Santiago, respectively, is expensive and unreliable. This transportation link is known as
the Bi-Oceanic Corridor.
The low quality of the Bi-Oceanic Corridor affects the following traffic flows negatively:
International traffic between Chile and Argentina; intercontinental traffic, specifically Chile
with the European Union and Argentina with the Pacific Rim and inter-oceanic traffic, i.e.
traffic connecting ports on the Atlantic Ocean, in particular Buenos Aires and
Montevideo, with ports on the Pacific Ocean, in particular Valparaiso. It follows that there
are large benefits to be expected from improving the transportation link.
It has been proposed to improve the link by building a 26 km long "low altitude" tunnel
with a maximum altitude of the route of 2760 m vs. the present 3185 m, which would
increase capacity and improve reliability. Such tunnels are expensive to build.
The crucial question is whether the benefits of such an undertaking justify the costs. The
purpose of this thesis, then, is to contribute to the answer of this question for this
particular project and to contribute to the answer of this question for projects in general.
The latter is conducted in Part I of the paper, comprising chapters 1 and 2. The former is
conducted in Part II of the paper, comprising chapters 3-7.
In Chapter 1 we develop an analytic framework for projects in general and consider
implications of time, risk and the principal-agent relationship for the design and evaluation
of projects. In Chapter 2 we focus our attention on transportation infrastructure projects.
We investigate how to optimally operate transportation infrastructure with respect to
ownership and pricing. We develop decision principles for choosing the optimal
technology and the optimal timing of investment, placing much emphasis on the
minimization of forecasting requirements in order to avoid making investment decisions on
the basis of unconvincing long term forecasts.
In the remaining chapters, comprising Part II, we apply the framework developed to the
particular tunnel project mentioned above to contribute to the answer to the question of
whether the benefits justify the costs. The main source document for our analysis is a
feasibility study of the tunnel project commissioned by the Argentinian and Chilean
governments and completed in 1995. In Chapter 3 a description of the project is given. In
Chapter 4 the technological options for improving the link are described and their cost
structure analyzed. In Chapter 5 the benefits are estimated. In Chapter 6 we synthesize
benefits and costs to determine the optimal technological option and timing of investment
on the basis of the assumptions in the model. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to
determine which assumptions, especially, ought to be questioned. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the results in Chapter 7.
The paper relies substantially on material provided in Figures and in the Appendix. This is
particularly true for the second part. The system of notation of the Appendix and for
Figures parallels the numbering of chapters in the main text: Complementary material to
chapter x.y.z is contained in Appendix x.y.z or in the text in Figure x.y.z.
PART I: ON THE EVALUATION AND DESIGN OF PROJECTS
GENERAL PROPERTIES OF PROJECTS
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND A STYLIZED MODEL
Everybody agrees that good projects ought to be done and bad projects ought not to be
done. This is a truism or perhaps even a tautology such as all bachelors are not married.
Disagreement sets in on the question of what constitutes a good project and what not, in
general and in particular.
The attributes of a project supposedly underlying the final good/bad verdict are many and
disparate. It follows that project appraisal is a complex undertaking.
It is a conceptual point that complexity is only dealt with in a non-arbitrary way by
analysis and synthesis: Analyze the projects into parts which are amenable for evaluation
and then synthesize the evaluations to arrive at a final verdict. In particular the
assumptions made and inferences from the assumptions drawn in the process ought to be
clearly stated.
A sufficient justification for conducting such a transparent analysis of projects is its
beneficial effect on debates about projects. Firstly, it enables disagreeing parties to
achieve second order agreement, i.e. to agree on what they actually disagree about.
Secondly, it is instrumental in finding ways to resolve disagreement. In addition it may
point out ways to optimize the design of a given project.
The goal of Part I of the thesis, then, is to contribute to the methodology for obtaining
such a transparent analysis. The discussion draws on the existing body of theory
developed under the headings of cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation and design.
The contributions of Part I of the thesis to the existing body of theory are:
CHAPTER 1 :
1. Deriving prevalent methods in cost-benefit analysis of projects based on
first principles;
2. Applying findings in organization theory to the design of projects;
3. Defending cost-benefit analysis against the criticism that it does not
consider all that is required to make an investment decision;
4. Applying microeconomic theory to question the trend of private
transportation infrastructure projects;
5. Elaborating on a decision principle for transportation projects that only
requires forecasting states of affairs at the start of operations of the
project rather than forecasting the states of affairs for the whole life of
the project.
In this section, we begin by developing a highly simplified model of a project. In the
following sections the simplifying assumptions will be dropped and realism, thereby,
added.
Conventionally, a project is understood to be an option that is different from the option to
continue with how things have been done or not so, the status quo option. In deciding
between the two options - implementing the project or continuing the status quo, we are,
in effect, deciding between two possible worlds - one with and the other without the
project'. The question then is how to compare the two possible worlds.
A project is an entity which requires inputs and produces outputs. Inputs and outputs
affect different entities (e.g. individuals, organizations) posititvely or negatively (or not at
all). Positive effects are measured as cash inflows or benefits and negative effects as cash
' We will conveniently refer to the possible world projected were the option implemented as "in the so and
so option".
outflows or costs of the project from that entity's perspective. Net benefits are equal to
benefits minus costs. Derivatively, costs and benefits of a collection of entities may be
summed to obtain the net benefit for that collective.
From the perspective of a particular entity a project is good if and only if the net benefits
accrued are greater or equal to that of the status quo.
In order to appraise a project from the collective perspective the following predicates are
useful: A project P is Pareto efficient if and only if every affected entity has net benefits
larger than those of the status quo. A project P is efficient 2 if and only if the sum of the
net benefits of the entities affected is larger than those of the status quo.
Unclouded by details the input/output model of projects suggests the following principle3:
P1 Choose efficient projects.
This principle follows readily from the premise that more good is preferred to less good
or, in collective language, more welfare is prefered to less welfare4 . To illustrate the point
consider the following homey instance of the principle: Suppose Jim, a ten year old boy,
is offered the following deal by his mother: If you mow the lawn then you can go to the
zoo. Suppose further that Jim dislikes lawn mowing more than he likes going to the zoo.
It then follows that if Jim was rational we would expect him to turn down the offer. The
underlying reasoning of that verdict, presumably, is that he receives less benefits than he
incurrs cost, which is precisely what principle Pl claims. A drastic way to describe what is
happening if he accepts the offer is to say that he is destroying value.
2 This is sometimes referred to as potentially Pareto efficient.
3 A principle is or is equivalent to a conditional statement of some general applicability: If such and such
is the case then such and such is or ought to be done or believed.
4 Is the proposition "more good is preferred to less good" capable of being justified or is it to be regarded
as a proposition that is self-evidently true on the basis of which other propositions may be justified but not
vice versa (nothing is as certain than that this proposition is true) - a so called first principle? I am taking
it as sufficiently self-evident to serve the function of a premiss.
The decision principle is readily adapted to the case of more than two options: Consider a
case in which there is a multitude of different ways to do a project. From a decision-
making point of view, this. is equivalent to saying that there is a multitude of different
projects, though this is somewhat stretching everyday usage of the term project. In order
to avoid neologisms let us refer to such a case as to a project for which there are different
options for realization. Including the status quo option this case, then, is equivalent to
choosing one of a set of different options and the principle, call it P *, is:
P1* Choose the option that maximizes net benefits.
The following is an argument designed to show that P1* follows from Pl: Suppose there
are n realizations of the project, Option 1 to Option n, with n a natural number or infinite.
We have to show that applying principle P or P * leads to the same choice. Suppose
without loss of generality that Option k maximizes net benefits. Clearly, applying P1*
leads to Option k. Does applying principle Pl also lead to Option k? Yes, if the decision
maker is willing and able to think conditionally. Suppose Option j is efficient relative to
the status quo and has less net benefits than Option k. Then, Option j, once chosen, is the
status quo option and directly, or after a repetition of the procedure, Option k is chosen as
it is then efficient relative to the "status quo option". Quod erat demonstrandum. This
argument also shows that the status quo option has no special status relative to the other
options from a decision making perspective5.
In the remainder let us drop one more assumption so far implicitly made and discuss the
implications of doing so. So far we have depicted the decision problem as choosing
among a given set of options. However there rarely are binding constraints or at least
there are enough dimensions without them such that new and better options could be
created. We juxtapose a static versus a dynamic approach to project evaluation: The
former is characterised by parts of the project that have an instrumental function dictating
the options to be evaluated relative to the substantive goal: creating net benefit. The
5 The status quo option, though, has one intrinsic advantage over the non-status quo options: Its net
benefits are known with a higher degree of certainty (i.e. less variance) as simple induction is available.
latter is characterised by an iterative process in which, directed towards the substantive
goal, the options are formulated, evaluated and reformulated6 . It appears that the process
in the dynamic approach is likely to yield better projects and may therefore be refered to as
optimization. This insight then motivates emphasizing the dynamic process in the
formulation of our decision principle by rephrasing principle P * into:
P1** Projects should be optimized (Choose optimal project).
Let us illustrate this principle by harking back to Jim. Suppose that Jim likes going to the
zoo more than he dislikes mowing the lawn. Suppose further, though, that he dislikes
doing the dishes less than mowing the lawn and that his mother would accept a zoo for
doing the dishes deal. Clearly Jim ought to accept that deal, which is consistent with what
Pl** would tell him to do.
So far we have been concerned with the concept of efficiency. We have defended the
decision principle to choose efficient projects and investigated its implications. Let us
now consider decision principles involving the concept of Pareto efficiency. Is there a
case to be made for transforming efficient projects into Pareto efficient projects, i.e. to
transform a project which is optimal with respect to the aggregate of the affected entities
into a project in which each entity is at least better off than in the status quo? In other
words should we apply the following principle?
P2 Efficient projects should be transformed into Pareto efficient
projects.
If the efficient project is also Pareto efficient then both decision principles lead to the same
choice. Unfortunately, conceptually and often enough in reality the decision principles P1
and P2 are not equivalent, i.e. they prescribe different choices. We will discuss ways to
harmonize P2 with P1 in the next section. The following are two thoughts to motivate
thinking about Pareto efficiency.
6 Clearly, these are the two poles of a continuum.
The second principle, P2, may be argued for by appeal to justice by the way of an
example: It is right to compensate the owner of a plot of land that is to be used for a new
airport. What, however, does compensation mean? Is it the price of the land in the
market? Using market prices leaves the owner worse off as he values the plot of land
higher than market price (otherwise he would have sold it before).
There is one special case in which an argument for the transformation of an efficient to a
more Pareto efficient project is available on pragmatic grounds: If an entity has a veto
over the project, then the project ought to be designed such that it is good from said
entity's perspective.
Let us sum up the lessons of this model : The evaluation of projects is essentially
perspectival. We distinguish between individual entities' perspectives and collective
perspectives of a project. In relation to a project an individual entity incurs net benefits
(or net costs). Derivatively, the net benefits/costs of a collective are the sum of the
individual entities net benefits/costs. Projects should be optimized relative to the pertinent
perspective'.
So far, our simple input/output model is not a helpful guide in the real world as it leaves
important questions unanswered: What are the entities? What is "the pertinent"
perspective? What are the relationships between perspectives? Does optimizing with
respect to one perspective imply optimization from another perspective? What are the
benefits/costs? It is to this questions that we now turn in a fairly general way. The
discussion could also, in a loose sense, be described as dropping the simplifying
assumptions in the above model one at a time. In Chapter 2 we will attempt to answer
these questions in more detail with respect to a particular subset of projects of which most
large scale infrastructure projects are a part, with the aim to develop an applicable
framework.
7 Hopefully the reader's tolerance of platitudes has not been overtaxed so far. But going back to first
principles generally is, as well as an effective way to focus matters, essentially dull : First principles are
first principles because they are obvious.
1.2 ON PERSPECTIVES ON PROJECTS: FINANCIAL. ECONOMIC AND
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Let us begin with project evaluation from one particular individual entity's perspective :
the potential private owner8 of the project. In order to determine net benefits or cost of
the project, this owner adds what has to be paid for the inputs and what is received for the
output. The prices paid and the prices charged are referred to as financial prices. Goods
used and produced for which no financial prices exist are not considered. For instance,
environmental degradation would enter as a cost only if the owner had to pay for it.
The analysis conducted by the owner is therefore also referred to as the financial analysis.
For the owner the necessary and sufficient condition to implement a project is financial
viability, i.e. positive net benefits in financial terms. It follows that a project is optimized
relative to the owner's perspective by maximizing financial returns.
As noted, the private owner's perspective on a project is only one perspective. It is an
important perspective for the following reasons: (1) If the project ought to be done
privately then financial viability is a necessary condition; (2) If the project is done
publically then it requires sufficient funding to be financially viable, for otherwise it is
simply not going to survive and the investment is lost.
However, it is advisable even for a private owner to consider at least the perspectives of
entities that have a veto power over the implementation of the project. This might be the
perspective of a sufficiently negatively affected and powerful entity such as a grass roots
movement or it might be the guardian of the interest of a collective such as the
government in an economy. It is to the latter perspective that we now turn.
S We simplify here by assuming that the project is 100% equity financed. If the project is partly debt
financed then the owner will regard the inflows of the debt as benefits and the repayment of principal and
interest as a cost. The banker on the other hand, being interested in the general viability of the project,
will consider the 100% equity financed perspective.
Let us now consider the project from the national economy as a widely studied
representative of one possible collective.
We begin with goods for which markets exist. We study the project's impact on the
collective for each unit of good used or produced one at a time and then aggregate the
costs and benefits. For each good we disaggregate the collective into suppliers and
consumers of that good. We assume:
1. The price required for suppliers to be willing to supply that unit of a
good measures the value of that unit to a supplier;
2. The willingness to pay of consumers to consume that unit of a given
good measures the value of that unit of that good to the consumer.
With these assumptions in place we can determine the cost from the collective's
perspective of a given unit of input or output, the so-called economic opportunity cost of
a unit of that good. The underlying idea is this: The economic opportunity cost of a unit
of a good is the value of that unit in its' best alternative use. The good might be for
instance cement, labor, foreign exchange or capital.
Consider an input to the project. That input comes either from consumption foregone by
other consumers or from increased production or from both, depending on the shape of
the willingness to pay and willingness to supply curves. The total economic cost of an
input to the project is, then, the sum of the cost of consumption foregone as measured by
the demand curve and the cost of increased production as measured by the supply curve.
Derivatively, the economic price or shadow price for a unit of that good used by the
project is the quotient of total economic cost and number of units consumed by the
project. Similarly, the output of the project either increases consumption or reduces
production by other suppliers in that market. The total economic benefit of the output of
the project is, then, the sum of the benefits of increased consumption as measured by the
demand curve and the benefits of decreased production by other suppliers, i.e. resource
savings. Derivatively the economic price or shadow price for a unit of that good produced
by the project is the quotient of total economic benefit and number of units produced by
the project 9 ". The relationship between economic prices and financial prices is
conventionally described by the quotient of economic price and financial price, referred to
as the conversion factor for that good. Based on the financial prices observable in the
market the ecnomic price is then calculated by the product of conversion factor and
financial price.
In the case that no markets exist for an effect of the project, or in other words in the case
of externalities", mapping an impact into a dollar value is more contentious. Consider for
instance the monetization of time savings, safety and the savings of life and impacts on the
environment 12. Note, however and importantly, that in the absence of a dominant option,
i.e. of one option being better than any other option with respect to all attributes ($ and
other attributes), choosing an option implies a set of monetizations of the non-monetized
attributes - and this condition is frequently satisfied. As transparency is a virtue we
monetize the impacts explicitly". Conceptually, externalities are monetized by estimating
individual's willingness to pay to enjoy a positive externality or individual's willingness to
pay to avoid a negative externality.
Aggregating all economic benefits and costs, then, yields the net benefits of the project
from the economic perspective. So from the economic perspective a project should be
9 Determining the economic opportunity cost of goods is technically more complicated in the presence of
distortions in the markets or if the effect on a project of a market is large. The cases of small effects and
market distortions are discussed in G. Jenkins, A. Harberger "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment
Decisions" chapters 7 - 13, using price elasticities of supply and demand. Unfortunately, in the case that
the effects of the project in a market is large elasticities by definition are not informative. It seems that
the only available option is to determine the shape of the supply and demand curves over the relevant
range.
~0 The reasoning described is further explained and applied in Chapter 5.
11 "An externality is any valued impact (cost or benefit) resulting from any action (whether related to
production or consumption) that affects someone who did not fully consent to it", Source: D. Weimar, A.
Vining "Policy Analysis" p. 57, Prentice Hall.
12 Articles on the evaluation of these impacts are to be found in R Layard, S. Glaister "Cost-Benefit
Analysis" p.235ff CUP, by The MVA consultancy, S. Rosen, M.W. Jones-Lee, P. Dasgupta and K.
Maeler, respectively.
"3 See Chapter 1.6.
implemented if net economic benefits are positive. Derivatively, a project is optimized by
maximizing economic returns.
Note that in the economic analysis, the benefits and costs accruing to different entities in
society are simply summed to obtain the net benefits. In other words, it is assumed that
the value of a dollar is independent of to whom it accrues. This assumption is prima facie
inconsistent with the common belief that an extra benefit to a needy man has more value
than an extra benefit to a rich man. One approach to incorporate this belief into the
economic analysis is to drop the assumption of "a dollar is a dollar" and to calculate net
benefits of a project by weighing the benefits and costs as a function of to which entity
they accrue, with the weights being positively correlated with the entity's neediness 4.
This approach is referred to as the distributional weights approach.
There are potent pragmatic objections to this approach' s. I will argue against it on two
grounds: (1) Using distributional weights consistently in project evaluation has an
implication that is inconsistent with beliefs that are both strong and prevalent: If transfer
of wealth could be accomplished without loss and the rich had lower distributional weights
than the poor then wealth ought to be redistributed until wealth among members of the
society is equalized' 6. The conclusion does not go well with beliefs such as wealth ought
to be positively correlated to achievement.
(2) I take it that, by and large, society's altruism to subsidize the less fortunate does not
extend to in-money subsidies (as by applying a higher weight to monetary benefits
accruing to them) but rather to in-kind subsidies in which case distributional weights is
misguided as it does not account for whether the money so transferred is spent on, say, a
14 In the literature this approach is discussed using the concept of utility. The idea, then, is to calculate
benefits in terms of the utility the recipient perceives rather than the dollar amount he receives. And as a
poor person perceives higher extra utility for extra money the benefit calculated for him ougth to be
higher. For a discussion: E. Stockey, R. Zeckhauser "A Primer for Policy Analysis" chapter 12, Norton.
'~ See for instance: A. Harberger "Basic Needs versus Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit
Analysis" Economic Development and Culture, Vol. 32, No. 3, April, 1984; A. Harberger "On the Use of
Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis".
16 This is a simplified and less realistic version of an argument advanced in: A. Harberger "Basic Needs
versus Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis".
new television set or on education for the children. This thought, then, leads to a second
approach to incorporate distributional impacts of a project in the economic analysis: For
basic needs, such as housing, that are satisfied as a consequence of the project a premium
is added over and above the willingness to pay of the consumer ("the poor"). The
premium is based on the degree of altruism in society. Technically speaking, the
satisfaction of a basic need is treated as a positive externality'7 . This approach is referred
as the basic needs approach. Note that in the basic needs approach the, assumption that
the value of dollar is independent of to whom it accrues is valid. Note that the basic needs
approach incorporates altruism without unpalatable implications. Thus, the basic needs
approach is the method of choice to incorporate distributional impacts in the evaluation of
a project and ought to be conducted to complement the economic analysis.
The basic needs approach indicates a method for harmonizing the principle P1 (Choose
efficient projects) with the principle P2 (Efficient projects should be transformed into
Pareto efficient projects). The idea is to treat a more equitable distribution as a positive
externality: Based on society's valuation add an "equity" premium to a more Pareto
efficient option. The author is not able to discern a simple principle for determining the
size of this positive externality.
In the remainder we will ignore distributional impacts, assuming that they are duely
incorporated as externalities, and focus on the economic analysis proper of projects.
In this section we have discussed the financial and the economic perspective on a project.
The existence of different perspectives with potentially conflicting verdicts on a project
raises the question of which perspective to take or in other words: who has standing.
The private sector decision maker focuses on financial viability and considers the
economic perspective only in so far as potential government (taking the economic
" For a more technical exposition see: G. Jenkings. A. Harberger "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment
Decisions" Chapter 14, Harvard Institute of International Development, 1996.
perspective) changes to the economic framework vitiate financial viability, for instance
abolishing subsidies or protective tariffs.
The public sector decision maker is in a different position: Normatively speaking, a
necessary condition for a project to be undertaken is that it has positive net benefits from
the economic perspective. Practically speaking, it is a necessary condition for a project to
be undertaken that it is financially viable, as it will otherwise simply not survive to deliver
the economic benefits. Positive net economic benefits and financial viability, jointly,
constitute a sufficient condition for implementing a project from a public decision maker's
perspective. As financial viability is achievable in the public sector by appropriating
sufficient funds"8, the only perspective to take from a decision making perspective is the
economic perspective. If the project is economically viable, then sufficient funds should
be appropriated.
Finally, a note on information: Transparency dictates that all impacts' 9 of the project and
to which entities they accrue should be listed. The quasi infinite cost of doing so and the
limited value of the information obtained through the analysis suggests a less thorough
analysis.
1.3 IMPLICATIONS OF TIME
Contrary to our idealized model so far, the cashflows of a real project occur at different
times. In general, a dollar at time t and a dollar at time t' with t not equal t' do not have
the same value. This proposition may be justified by the reluctance of most people to
trade a dollar now for a dollar one year hence. It follows that cashflows occuring at
different times have to be made commensurate. In practice the cashflows occuring at
different periods are expressed relative to the dollar of a given period (base period)20: Let
" Indeed, in a last analysis, financial viability is a function of the regulatory framework in the economy.
'9 Note the following sobering truism: only impacts of the project that are valued by human beings today
may be considered in the evaluation of projects. Impacts of a project on later generations, animals, etc.
are thus only indirectly taken into account (or not so).
20 If the time period chosen is the presence then the net benefit thus calculated is refered to as the net
present value (NPV) of an option.
t' be the period of reference and let t, t > t', be the period in which cashflow ct occurs.
Let ct' be the equivalent of ct in terms of period t dollars. Let d be defined by: 1$ at
period t = d + 15 at period t'. d is referred to as the discount rate. Then, (l+d)*ct' = ct
or equivalently ct' = ct / (1+d). The crucial question is how to determine the discount rate
d.
For simplicity, let us consider a two period project: Investment of $100 in period 1 and
operations with benefits of $110 in period 2. Then, comparing the project and the status
quo option the discount rate expresses what would have been done with the $10021 in the
status quo option were they not invested - the opportunity cost of capital2223 . To justif"
this method of estimation note that it is bad reasoning to turn down an offer by pointing
out an option that is not available. It follows that the discount rate depends on the origins
of the funds or, better, on what use would be displaced by the project.
Let us apply the principle to determine the correct discount rate in four examples: (1)
Suppose a private investor may either give the $100 to the bank getting $108 at the end of
period 2 or invest in the project. Note that the appropriate discount rate for him then is
8% and that at 8% NPV = $2 and thus the project should be undertaken; (2) Suppose the
government may borrow the $100 on the capital market of the economy, from which $40
come from investors willing to pay on average 12% and $60 come from savers willing to
supply capital at an average of 13%. The cost of capital to the economy or discount rate
then is 0.40*0.12 + 0.60*0.13 = 12.6%. That means that put to its best alternative use the
$100 would have yielded $112.60 in the economy. Adopting the project would thus
destroy $2.60; (3) Suppose the government would borrow the $100 on the international
capital market at 13%. Then it should not implement the project as $3 would thereby be
destroyed; (4) Suppose that due to budgeting technicalities the $100 are available to the
21 Remember: The $100 is only the medium of exchange - real resources such as land, machinery and
labour are used in the project rather than in their best alternative uses.
22 That the two option two period case is a perfect representative of the multi option multi period cases is
shown, respectively, in Section 1.1 and in the preceding paragraph. It is also easily seen that the
sequence of benefits and costs is immaterial.
23 Note that we are here discussing the estimation of the opportunity cost of one particular input: capital
(through time).
government and that it could lend the $100 in the world market at 11%. Then, the $100
should be lent as otherwise $1 is destroyed. The examples might suggest that the discount
rate is necessarily positive. That this is not always the case is shown by the phenomenon
that some Swiss banks charge interest on deposits 24 .
We conclude: To retain additivity cashflows accruing at different times are expressed in a
common dimension using a discount rate. The discount rate is the opportunity cost of
capital.
1.4 IMPLICATIONS OF UNCERTAINTY AND RISK
Projects are events that take place in the future and, thus, the net benefits of a project is a
function of future states of affairs25 . The effect of a given state of affairs on the net
benefits of the project is usually known but it is essentially uncertain which one of a set of
possible states of affairs obtains in the future. In order to rank the options, a mapping
from the set of net benefits of an option under each possible states of affairs into a real
number is required unless there exists an option dominating all other option in all possible
states of affairs. Note that making a choice implies having chosen a subset of such maps.
It is immaterial whether this is done explicitly. Transparency dictates that the choice be
made consciously26: An intuitively appealing map is the sum of the products of the
expected probability of occurrence of a state of affairs and the net benefit of the option
given that state of affairs. This is labeled the expected value of an option. Given the
probabilites of occurrence of states of affairs and the net benefits given the states of affairs
the riskiness of the project may be quantified, for instance in terms of variance of net
benefits.
24 E. Stokey, R. Zeckhauser "A Primer for Policy Analysis" p. 175, Norton.
25 States of affairs are also referred to as contingencies.
26 That making the choice unconsciously has sufficient prevalence to merit attention is evidenced by the
following result of research in managerial decision making "Although managers do not deny the
possibility of failure, their idealized self-image is not a gambler but a prudent and determined agent, who
is in control of both people and events", in D. Kahneman, D. Lovallo "Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:
A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking"; For a further discussion on the transparency see Section 1.6.
As the probabilities assigned to the future states of affairs may have a large impact on the
design of the option and the final choice of an option much care must be taken in the
process. Recent cognitive research indicates a systematic fallacy in determining
probability distributions"2 . Two modes of forecasting may be distinguished: An inside
view and an outside view: "An inside view forecast is generated by focussing on the case
at hand, ..., by constructing scenarios of future progress, and by extrapolating current
trends. The outside view ... essentially ignores the details of the case at hand, and involves
no attempt at detailed forecasting of the future history of the project. Instead, it focusses
on the statistics of a class of cases chosen to be similar in relevant respects to the present
one. The case at hand is also compared to other members of the class, in an attempt to
asses its position in the distribution of outcomes for the class"' 8 . Cognitive experiments
indicate, and this should not come as a surprise, that the outside view provides higher
quality forecasts while the inside view is more prevalent in forecasting29".
A readily accessible example is this: "Academics are familiar with a related example:
finishing our papers almost always takes us longer than we expected. We all know this
and often say so. Why then do we continue to make the same error? Here again, the
outside view does not inform judgements of particular cases "" .
The crucial issue in the applicability of the outside view is the representativeness of a
chosen class of cases. Unfortunately, there is no easy criterion to settle this issue.
Independently of the question whether we should think of our use of probabilities to
describe the future as signs of our ignorance in the face of an actually certain world or
whether probabilities are real, i.e. there are true or false probability propositions, the
27 Source: D. Kahneman. D. Lovallo "Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on
Risk Taking' Management ScienceN/ol.39, No. 1, January 1993 and Taylor and Brown (1988); See also:
D. Weimar, A. Vining "Policy Analysis" p.85, Prentice Hall.
28 Source: D. Kahneman. D. Lovallo "Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on
Risk Taking" Management Science/Vol.39, No.1, January 1993.
29 Source: D. Kahneman, D. Lovallo "Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on
Risk Taking" Management Science/Vol.39, No. 1, January 1993 and Taylor and Brown (1988).
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empirical fact remains that we can make sense of the idea that some probability
distributions are closer to the truth than others and that the process of obtaining these
more revealing probability distributions is not costless. Thus, a trade-off exists between
the costs and benefits of improving our information situation. Interpreting such an
improvement as a test, the benefits and costs may be analysed in the framework of
decision and event trees31 .
Having conducted the above analysis an option is described in two dimensions: expected
net benefits, in $, and riskiness, perhaps in variance. As above - in order to rank the
options explicitly, a mapping of net benefit and risk into one dimension has to be found.
The result is then the expected net benefit adjusted for risk.
We proceed in three steps to develop a method for adjusting for risk: (I) The risk attitude
of the reader is revealed by introspection; (II) The risk attitude of the reader is assumed to
be sufficiently representative of the risk attitude of individuals in general; (III) Implications
from (I) and (II) as to how expected net benefits ought to be adjusted for risk in the
evaluation of projects are drawn.
(1) Suppose you are offered the following two options: Option A: Throw a fair coin. If
the coin comes heads then you win $200. Otherwise you lose $100; Option B: $40 for
sure. Option A has an expected value of $50 and option B has an expected value of $40.
Which option do you choose? I expect you to have chosen option B32. This means
nothing less than the risk involved in option B imposes a cost of that option of at least $10
in expected value terms. This is referred to as the risk premium.
Let us now slightly change the offer: You can choose a hundred times between option A
and option B. The expected value for choosing A each time (option A') is $5000 and for
31 For an exposition, see E. Stockey, R. Zeckhauser "A Primer for Policy Analysis" p.219ff., Norton.
32 If you happen to choose option A, then the line of reasoning presented here ought not be persuasive. In
this case see Mac Crimmon and Wehring 1986 or Swalm 1966 for empirical studies defending that risk
aversion is prevalent in choices between favorable prospects with known probabilities. (Source: D.
Kahneman, D. Lovallo "Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking"
Management Science/Vol.39, No. 1, January 1993.
choosing B each time (option B') is $4000. I expect you to choose option A' as the risk
in aggregate is minimal. The conclusion is that you are risk averse and that you are aware
of the portfolio effect that diversification reduces risk. In the case of perfect
diversification you are an expected value maximizer.
(II) There are two ways to derive the conclusions in (III) from (I). One is to regard your
attitude and beliefs regarding risk as sufficiently representative. The other is to endow
your attitudes a normative quality (not qua being your attitudes though). Either way, we
then can infer the following for the evaluation of projects.
(III) From the perspective of a private project owner for whom a project constitutes a
large portion of his wealth and for whom the project therefore is not part of a large
portfolio a cost for risk should be added33 commensurate with the degree of risk-
averseness. Similarly, for an individual entity exposed to high and non-diversifiable risk,
consider for instance a community living next to a nuclear power station, discounting for
risk is indicated.
On the other hand consider the perspective of the government in the evaluation of a given
public project. We assume that government decisions should reflect individual's
valuations of costs and benefits and here, in particular individual's valuations of risk. As
the government conducts many (and let us assume statistically independent) projects in
which each individual taxpayer has a small share it follows that the risk of that project is
diversified away in the individual taxpayer's portfolio and that each indivdual taxpayer
would, therefore, want the project to be chosen on grounds of expected benefit
maximization 3435. In terms of options A, A', B and B' each project is equivalent to the
33 This is commonly done by increasing the discount rate as to discount for time and risk. This method,
however, is conceptually unconvincing as it presumes that the riskiness of cashflows is directly positively
correlated with time. A more justified approach is to ask the question for a given cashflow: What is the
smallest certain payoff for which I would exchange the risky cashflow? For an elaboration on this line of
reasoning see: R Brealey, S. Myers "Principles of Corporate Finance" p. 201ff., McGraw Hill.
34 Note that this approach is consistent with the approach taken in the evaluation of costs and benefits
from the economic perspective above (Section 1.2): Costs and benefits are computed on the basis of
individual's willingness to pay and so are here the cost of risk bearing.
government choosing for each throw of a coin whether an individual taxpayer gets the
rewards of option A or option B and does so for a large number of times. As noted the
individual would prefer that option A' would be chosen on his behalf rather than option
B'.
An argument advanced against not discounting for risk for public investments is that it
crowds out private investment in the case that the private return on a project not adjusted
for risk is higher but adjusted for risk is lower than the return on the public project. This
is not convincing: The extra cost due to risk is a real cost from the private perspective
just like machinery or labor and thus ought to be considered accordingly. It then follows
that the public project has a higher return than the private project which means that the
private investor could be compensated and there would still be additional value. Thus the
public project is efficient relative to the private project.
The main result in this section is that in the evaluation of a public project cashflows ought
not to be discounted for risk apart from those cashflows that accrue to individuals and are
not diversified away.
1.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776, Cannan Edition :
"The directors of such (joint stock) companies, however, being the managers rather of
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a privated
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt
to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give
3 For a formal derivation of this result see: K. Arrow and R. Lind "Risk and Uncertainty, in Cost and
Benefit Analysis" R. Layard, S. Glaister, Cost-Benefits Analysis, CUP. (The result ought to also apply to
large public corporations. It does not because the managers have good reason to be risk averse.) Note that
the cashflows accruing to individual entities that are not diversifiable are to be discounted for risk, as in
the nuclear power case.
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company"
Projects are designed to optimize the objective function of the principal. That could be
profit maximization in the case of a sole owner or the shareholder or welfare in the case of
a government project. To implement and operate the project the principal engages agents
to perform some service (either because there are to many decisions to be made or the
agent has special knowledge that the principal lacks) which implies delegating decision
making authority. Agents take decisions with respect to their own objective function
which may or may not diverge from the principal's objective function. An agent that acts
according to the principal's objective function is labeled a perfect agent. Then, the sum of
cost accruing by aligning the agent's with the principal's objective function and the
residual difference in value in terms of the principal's objective function between the
actions of a non-perfect agent and a perfect agent are referred to as agency cost36. Note
that in the absence of perfect agents, or in the absence of a 100% owner realizing the
whole project, agency costs are unavoidable3 .
A major element in the prinicpal - agent contract is the allocation of risk. Remember from
above that risk is a function of the probabilities assigned to states of affairs and the
outcomes of the project, given states of affairs, or, in this context more aptly, part of the
project in given states of affairs. The two poles on a continuum of risk allocation between
the principal and agent are these: The agent is remunerated independently of the actual
outcome of his part of the project; The agent is remunerated dependently of the actual
ouctome of his part of the project. In the former case the agent bears all the risk in his
part of the project. In the latter he bears no risk3 8. In the absence of risk bearing by the
agent insurance theory predicts costs due to moral hazard: The reduced incentive to
36 This category includes monitoring cost and cost of control systems such as pay for performance.
37 The ideas in this paragraph are adapted from : M. Jensen, W. Meckling "Theory of the Firm :
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" Journal of Financial Economics (1976),
p. 308.
3s In other words: In the former case there is a strong pay - perfomance relationship. In the latter case
there is a weak pay - performance relationship.
design his part of the project in such a way as to reduce the downside were certain adverse
states of affairs to occur leads to a suboptimal design of a project in expected value
terms". On the other hand, if the agent is exposed to risk and is risk averse cost due to
risk accrues. Thus, the principal faces an incentive - risk trade-off in the minimization of
agency cost.
Clearly, and clearly independently of the type of principal, the principal-agent relationship
ought to be defined in such a way as to minimize agency cost. Note that this might imply
involving agents in the design process of the project.
1.6 DEFENSE AGAINST A COMMON CRITICISM OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
So far we have been describing elements of cost-benefit analysis without dealing with
criticisms of the methodology. Here, we will focus on one particularly popular argument
against cost-benefit analysis.
In short, in the cost-benefit analysis of an option relevant attributes are predicted and then
monetized. The decision criterion, then, is: the option with highest net benefits in $ terms
ought to be chosen. The argument advanced against this method, then, is of or is
translatable equivalently into the following form (The number in the second column stands
for the proposition in that line. The number(s) in the first column stand(s) for the
proposition(s) on which the proposition in that line is based):
39 M. Jensen writes : "While there are many events that are beyond the control of managers, there are
very few events whose consequences are beyond managers control (in Course Notes, CCMO, 1995); Levitt
et al. (1980) : "A balancing of the risk should be sought between the owner and his contractor or designer
in order to utilize the incentive value of bearing risk while minimizing a contingency charged for
accepting the risk"; C. Gordon (1994) seems to confuse the occurrence of different states of affairs
(uncontrollable) with the effects of a given states of affairs on the project (controllabele -a question of the
design of the project) when he writes : "A company's efficiency in handling risk is based on its power to
control the risk, ... "
i 1 Either the attributes of the different options are too difficult
to predict or there exists at least one attribute that is not
monetizable or both
1 2 The description of an option in $ terms does not contain all
that is needed to make a decision. The decision criterion is
not valid.
Indeed, supporters of this view have no shortage of examples to justify their premiss.
Here just one example: How should Turkey predict and monetize the political
implications of building a water dam enabling them to considerably reduce Syria's water
supply?
Our defense of cost-benefit analysis is not going to be to claim that predicting and
monetizing, even choosing the right, attributes is an easy matter. This is a losing
proposition. Our argument is this40:
1 1 There exists no option such that it is better than all other
options with respect to all attributes, i.e. no dominant option;
I 2 In choosing an option a relative valuation (trade-off) is implied
between at least two attributes (potentially many). This choice then
reveals that the decision maker believes in one of the set of
monetizations of these attributes that are consistent with his choice.
Thus a set of monetizations4' is necessarily implied in a choice;
40 1 realize that this style of presentation is pretentious in that it ressembles the form in which logical or
mathematical arguments are presented. It does not need mentioning that the conclusiveness of my
argument is not that of a mathematical or logical proof. I believe that the benefits due to a more lucid
presentation outweigh the cost due to pretentiousness (without monetizing).
4 Any index would do: An index is a map from an n-tuple into a I-tuple. The index of choice, clearly, is
to map into money.
3 3 The choice is derived more transparently if the decision maker
explicitly states his valuation of attributes, i.e. monetizes the
attributes: Disagreement on which option to choose is
transferred to disagreement on how to value certain attributes.
This type of disagreement tends to be more amenable to a
principled solution as participating parties are less emotional about
abstract issues: Settling in abstract how the attribute should be
valued and then accept the implications for the decision at hand42.
4 4 Transparency is a virtue;
4 5 What is virtuous ought to be done;
1,3,4 6 Attributes ought to be monetized43
The crux of the matter is this: Even though monetizing and predicting attributes is subject
to error and often unpleasant44 we do so implicitly by chosing an option anyway. It seems
preferable to explicitly predict and monetize in a principled way the attributes as good as
42 The effectivenes of this approach of settling conflicts is somewhat reduced by a mode of argument
refered to as reductio ad absurdum: If A implies B and B is false then A is false: If the principle implies
that option A is better than option B, and I know that option B is better than option A then the principle,
whatever reasoning we adduced in its favour, is false. While a valid and very powerful mode of
reasoning, its application in this context seems to be a sign of intellectual dishonesty.
43 The argument for "difficult" to predict attributes is analoguous. Line 6, then, reads : Attributes ought
to be predicted.
" Should $4 million be spent on new road signs which are expected to save one life? What about $10,
$20 or $100 million? (We assume for the purpose of illustration that reducing fatal road accidents is the
only benefit of new road signs). Consider the thesis that the value of life is infinite: An individual is
thinking about crossing a street in order to reach a bakery and believes that the value of life is infinite. In
expected value terms there is some finite benefit of crossing the street, namely being able to go shopping
in the bakery. Note, however, that there is an infinite cost of doing so as the product of the a small
probability of having a fatal accident and the infinite negative value of death is infinite. Thus, such an
individual would never cross the street to go shopping in the bakery or for that reason do anything which
increases the probability of untimely death. It turns out that there are no individuals behaving in such a
way and that therefore the value of life, or better the value of statistical life, is not perceived to be infinite.
For different approaches of determining the value of life by revealed preference see : M. Jones-Lee
"Safety and the savings of life : The economics of safety and physical risk" Cost-Benefit Analysis, ed. R.
Layard, S. Glaister, CUP.
we can, than to take "gut" decisions. Note that in the face of less than perfect predictions
and monetizations a diligent sensitivity analysis is indicated.
Two remarks on the above argument: Assumption I is in place as the decision problem
otherwise has a trivial solution. The argument simplifies considerably and perhaps gains in
force if one considers the following special case where all but one attribute, call it X, is
monetized and there are two options A and B. Option A lacks the attribute altogether but,
based on the other attributes, has $n more benefits than Option B. Choosing option B
than implies that the non-monetized attribute is valued at at least $n.
1.7 SUMMARY
In Chapter 1 we have discussed the properties of projects in a very general way. We
defined a project as an entity having the following properties: It consumes inputs and
produces outputs through time and affects entities and collections of entities in the
process. We then elaborated consequences from these properties. These findings are
applicable to everything in the real world that fits the definition of a project or in other
words that have the above properties. As there are many such things our findings are
generally applicable. Unfortunately, there is only so much that can be said on projects
without making further assumptions on the kind of goods used and consumed or the
distribution of cashflows through time. In order to be able to deliver practical and specific
evaluation criteria it is necessary to make additional assumptions thus restricting our
attention to a subset of the category of projects. This is the objective of Chapter 2. The
subcategory of projects considered comprises many, if not all, large-scale transportation
infrastructure projects.
CHAPTER 2: FOCUSSING ON A SUBSET OF PROJECTS: LARGE-
SCALE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
2.1 DEFINING A SUBSET: LARGE SCALE TRANSPORTATION
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
We focus our attention to a subset of projects. It is to those projects that, in addition to
the properties stated in Chapter 1, also have the following properties:
1. Characteristics of supply are only alterable in large steps - we refer to
this as lumpiness in investment;
2. Real investment cost are constant with respect to time;
3. Demand is monotonically increasing with respect to time;
4. Demand is non-uniformly distributed throughout the day and the year -
we refer to this as peaking in demand;
5. Natural monopoly: fixed costs of providing good are high relative to
the variable cost so that average cost declines over the relevant range
of demand45.
The extension of this subset of projects includes (many) large-scale transportation
infrastructure projects: (1) Investment in transportation infrastructure is lumpy and large:
a partial bridge, tunnel or locomotive are without value; (2) This is a plausible simplyfing
assumption; (3) The benefits as measured by the demanders willingness to pay for
transportation generally increase through time as demand for transportation is positively
related with economic activity and economic activity tends to increase through time; (4)
45 Definition from: D. Weimar, A. Vining "Policy Analysis" p.62., Prentice Hall.
Demand for transportation is non-uniformly distributed through time; (5) Transportation
infrastructure such as tunnels or bridges is characterized by large investment cost and low
marginal cost over the range of demand up to capacity. Thus, they satisfy the definition of
a natural monopoly which means that such a good is provided most efficiently by a single
supplier - why have two bridges if one would be enough.
As evaluation of transportation projects is clearly worthwhile, it is warranted to consider
the subset of projects defined by assumptions 1 - 5. For convenience we refer to the
subset as transportation projects. Note, however, that this does not imply that all and only
that which is commonly referred to as a transportation project falls into this category.
Let us now consider the typical situation in the evaluation of a transportation project from
the financial and economic perspective. To simplify terminology and without loss of
generality, let us refer to the good produced in the status quo or in a proposed project as a
transit and the entity that enables the transits the transportation link. For the same reason,
terms specifically used in the evaluation of transportation systems are used. The question
we want to answer is how to optimally deliver the transportation link. The options
available differ with respect to technology, timing of implementation and ownership of
transportation link.
2.2 NATURAL MONOPOLY, OWNERSHIP AND PRICING
From the economic perspective the efficient price, P*, for a unit of a good is determined
by the intersection of the consumers willingness to pay curve (demand curve) and the
marginal cost curve: Assume that the price P was higher than P*. Then a potential
consumer valuing this unit of the good lower than P but higher than P* does not consume.
The difference between the consumer's valuation and the cost of that unit is then welfare
foregone. Assume that the price P was lower than P*. Then a potential consumer valuing
this unit of the good lower than P* but higher than the price does consume. The
difference between the consumer's valuation and the cost of that unit, is then welfare
foregone.
In order to focus on one issue at a time, we assume that no externalities and distortions
are present in the market for transits, i.e. marginal cost = marginal social cost. Dropping
this assumption is expected to increase the difference in net benefits between optimizing a
project from the financial perspective versus optimizing a project from the economic
perspective. To begin with, we assume that no congestion occurs on the link.
As in a natural monopoly the fixed costs are high relative to the variable costs and the
marginal cost is below average cost. Thus, charging the economically efficient price
results in the project operating at a financial loss. On the other side, optimizing the project
in financial terms by charging the price where the marginal revenue curve intersects with
the marginal cost curve implies welfare losses. Note that providing a project privately
implies that it is optimized financially. Providing it publically is expected to lead to
economic optimization 46. Making users pay their way by charging average cost is
suboptimal relative to both the economic and the financial perspective. The situation is
depicted diagrammatically in Figure 2.2-147.
In times of congestion the marginal cost curve is not constant as depicted in the diagram.
This is illustrated by the following example: Suppose 999 vehicles using a bridge require
10 minutes each to cross. Suppose the 1000th vehicle has the effect of increasing the
travel time for each vehicle by 1 minute. The marginal cost of the 1000th vehicle is then
1010 minutes48 . Optimally, this vehicle would then be charged the monetary equivalent of
1010 minutes for the transit. The occurrence of congestion is explained by the lumpiness
in investment and the peaking in demand: The trade-off is between having more capital
cost and less cost due to congestion and having more cost due to congestion but less
capital cost.
The effect of congestion on pricing is depicted diagrammatically Figure 2.2-249
46 Note that the private and public provision are two poles of a continuum. The evaluation and design of
joint public and private provision follows from the properties of these absolute cases.
47 Source: Weimar, Vining "Policy Analysis" p. 64, Prentice Hall.
48 This example is plagiarized from: D. Weimar, A. Vining "Policy Analysis" p.48. Prentice Hall.
49 Source: D. Weimar, A.Vining "Policy Analysis" p.47, Prentice Hall.
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In the face of an upward sloping marginal cost curve, then, the following situation,
depicted in Figure 2.2-350 might arise.
Note that, contrary to the case of the flat marginal cost curve considered above, charging
the economically efficient price Pc yields a financially viable project (i.e. total financial
benefits > total financial costs). Also, contrary to above, making the users pay by
charging average cost leads to transits being valued at less than their cost
(overconsumption) and thus to an inefficient allocation. As above, optimizing the project
financially yields an undersupply from the economic perspective. In an investment
decision this translates into a too small capacity and in the pricing decision this translates
into a too high price from the economic perspective5'. A drastic real life example for
inefficient pricing (though not for a "too small investment") is the (private) Acapulco -
Mexico City toll road in 1992: The private toll road costing more than USD 100 from
Acapulco to Mexico City is virtually empty while the parallel non-toll road is congested 52.
In the face of the inefficiency of optimizing a transportation project financially, the current
popularity of private transportation infrastructure projects might come as a surprises.
Before we turn to arguments in favor of private sector supply let us investigate tools to
mitigate the efficiency gap between optimizing a transportation project financially and
economically. Classically two regulatory tools are used: taxation and price ceilings.
Taxation has the effect of redistributing part of the monopolists rent to the general public.
However, the quantity supplied is further reduced and the price charged is higher than in
the non-taxation situation. The price increase may even be higher than the (per unit) tax.
so Source: D. Weimar, A. Vining "Policy Analysis" p. 38, Prentice Hall.
" This result holds irrespectively of the existence of congestion or not.
52 Source: Author's experience.
53 We assume that a private supplier of transportation infrastructure optimizes with respect to the
financial perspective as opposed to a public supplier who optimizes with respect to the economic
perspective.
From an efficiency perspective deadweight loss54 is incurred in the process of taxation.
This result is derived in Figure 2.2-4 55.
A price ceiling has a similar effect as taxation: The quantity supplied is reduced56. The
allocation process might disparagingly be described as Soviet style through queues: An
effective way to accumulate economic cost due to the value of time. Furthermore,
deadweight loss is incurred. In the case of sufficiently inelastic demand the consumer
surplus might even be reduced. These results are derived in Figure 2.2-557.
In the light of the above results, the findings in Miller (1995)58 concerning a privately
provided (Build-Operate-Transfer5 9) tunnel in Hong Kong should not come as a surprise:
"The traffic projection risk turned out not to exist. Traffic volumes have been at capacity
through much of the franchise period, despite surcharges by the government to the tolls
charged by the franchisee. Because the financial performance of the tunnel is private, the
actual rate of return ("ROR" (sic!)) on this investment are (sic!) not known, but it is
reasonably certain that ROR exceeds 15-18%, since traffic volume remains steady at
tunnel capacity."
54 Deadweight loss is a reduction in the sum of consumer's surplus and producer's surplus. Consumer's
surplus is the amount of money consumers are willing to pay in addition to what they actually pay.
Producer's surplus is the amount of money producers receive in addition to what they would be willing to
produce for. See Figure 2.2-5.
55 Source: Pindyck, Rubinfeld "Microeconomics" p.329, Prentice Hall.
56 As marginal cost to the provider is small (marginal cost increase in congestion is mainly due to cost of
time of consumers) this effect may be small as a consequence of operations choices. But price ceilings,
clearly, lead to underinvestment.
57 Source: R, Pindyck, D. Rubinfeld "Microeconomics" p. 279, Prentice Hall.
51 J. Miller "Aligning Infrastructure Development Strategy to Meet Current Public Needs" Doctoral
Thesis.
59 Definition : One business entity that performs design, construction, construction and long-term
financing, and temporary operation of the project. At the end of the operation period, which can be many
years, operation of the project is transferred to the owner; Source: Gordon "Choosing Appropriate
Construction Contracting Method" Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 120, No.
1. Mar. 1994, p. 196.
FIGURE 2.2-3: PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF UPWARD SLOPING
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FIGURE 10.5 Effect of Excise Tax on Monopolist With a tax t per unit, the firm's
effective marginal cost is increased by the amount t to MC + t. In this example, the
increase in price AP is larger than the tax t.
I
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FIGULRE 9.2 Change in Consumer and Producer Surplus from Price Controls. The
price of a good has been regulated to be no higher than Pm,,, which is below the mar-
ket-clearing price Po. The gain to consumers is the difference between rectangle A and
triangle B. The loss to producers is the sum of rectangle A and triangle C. Triangles B
and C together measure the deadweight loss from price controls.
FIGURE 2.2-5:
Is the conventional wisdom in Hong Kong that "if the private sector will provide them, it
is substantially better for the public and for the government to have private entities design,
build, operate and maintain major infrastructure facilities" o°, ungrounded?
A possible rationalization is provided by agency costs: As the link between pay and
performance and the monitioring of the actions by the taxpayer of public decision makers
tend to be weaker than in the private case the agency costs are to be expected to be
higher. One effect of this fact is described as the private provision yielding a "sanity
check" on the worthwhileness of the project. Another effect is described as the private
sector being "more efficient ' '6 . Note that these positive effects have to be weighed
against the cost due to risk62.
Another argument in favour of private provision is that governments often do not have
enough money to provide all infrastructure "needs". Note, firstly, the misleading
description of the situation by the use of term "needs" 6364: There are no needs in the
absolute sense from the economic perspective - only a weighing of benefits and costs.
This appeal to budget constraints, then, rests on the assumption that governments do not
60 J. Miller "Aligning Infrastructure Development Strategy To Meet Current Public Needs" Doctoral
Thesis, p. 40.
61 A privately designed and built road and bridge in Hong Kong had capital cost averaging 60% of
government estimates; Source: J. Miller "Aligning Inftrastructure Development Strategy To Meet Current
Public Needs" Doctoral Thesis, pp. 47, 49.
62 For an estimate of the cost of risk consider: J. Miller "Aligning Infrastructure Development To Meet
Current Public Needs" Doctoral Thesis, pp 41, 42: "What makes large infrastructure projects suitable for
private financing, from the point of view of financial markets? ... Third, there must be a "good" return
available from the project ... at levels higher than other, more traditional investments. (Returns of 15-18%
are typical for these projects in Hong Kong)".
63 M. Jensen "The Nature of Man": "Using the word need as an imperative is semantic trickery. The
media and press are filled with talk about housing needs, education needs, food needs, energy needs, and
so on. Politicians and others who use that language understand that the word need carries emotional
impact. It implies a requirement at any cost; if the need is not met, some uspecified disaster will take
place. Such assertions have a far different impact if restated to reflect the facts. The proposition that
"people want more housing if they can get it cheaply enough" does not ring out from the podium or over
the airwaves with the same emotional appeal as "people need more housing"."
" Consider the following publications: European Conference of Ministers of Transport "European
transport trends and infrastructural needs" (1995); J. Miller "Aligning Infrastructure Development To
Meet Current Public Needs" Doctoral Thesis.
have the ability to raise funds through debt or taxes, even though the returns of the project
are higher than the cost of capital. And this assumption is rarely met65.
In a similar vein, consider this argument by Miller66: A significant additional benefit is that
these landfills were financed in private markets by the operators themselves. If, what is
likely, the private operators are regarded as more risky than the government, then private
financing is a cost and not a benefit.
We note that the decision to provide transportation infrastructure privately or publically is
by no means settled by appeal to catchwords such as "the private sector is more efficient".
The benefits of private sector provision, such as higher "efficiency", sanity check and less
agency costs (from the financial perspective), have to be weighed carefully against the
costs (from the economic perspective), such as agency costs accrued by optimizing a
project from the financial rather than the economic perspective and risk. This cost-benefit
analysis is applicable to any combination of public and private supply, the so called public-
private partnerships. In fact, the procurement system ought to be considered as just
another variable, analaguous to technology, of the project which should be chosen such as
to optimize the overall project economically.
Let us, finally, turn to one particular alternative to monopoly pricing and efficient pricing:
The policy of average cost pricing.
In order to implement average cost pricing the project has to be either public or private
with the proviso that instruments are available to the government to insure that the private
supplier does not revert to monopoly pricing. The latter proviso is not easily satisfied.
As derived in Figure 2.2-1, average cost pricing is inefficient. The question, then, arises
whether there are benefits outweighing the efficiency loss. It is often held that average
65 The reply that governments might not choose to take debt eventhough the project has positive net
benefits hardly carries normative weight.
66J. Miller "Aligning Infrastructure Development To Meet Current Public Needs" Doctoral Thesis.
cost pricing is less arbitrary than efficient pricing. On closer inspection, however, this
position is as reasonable as to believe that strawberries should cost the same throughout
the year, i.e. not reasonable at all. Another line of argument appeals to justice. Average
cost pricing is claimed to be more just than efficient pricing as the users pay their way.
We will not pursue the question ofjustice.
From the above discussion we can safely, and rather modestly, conclude a necessary
condition for a project to be a candidate for implementation: Efficiently priced, a project
has positive net benefits from the economic perspective.
2.3 TECHNOLOGY AND TIMING
We begin by developing a method for deciding in a given year whether to alter supply
radically67 or whether to continue with the status quo, i.e. we assume that there are only
two options. Let us refer to the former as the investment option and to the latter as the
status quo option. Subsequently we discuss limitations of the method and propose ways
to overcome them.
The relevant technological attributes on a per year basis of an option may be analysed into
its fixed cost and variable cost structure.
Fixed costs accrue independently of the quantity of transits. Fixed costs comprise the
costs incurred to attain a capacity and a variable cost structure. In other words, fixed
costs comprise the cost of capital. As maintenance in this framework is such that it retains
the cost structure, depreciation is not considered. In addition fixed costs comprise the
cost of externalities that accrue independently of the quantity of transits, for instance a
neighbourhood that is bisected by a road.
Variable costs are a function of the quantity of transits. Examples of variable costs are
energy costs, maintenance, time spent travelling and safety costs (being exposed to a
67 See assumption 1, Section 2.1.
certain probability of an accident). Furthermore, and importantly, at capacity the cost of a
marginal transit is large due to congestion and the rate of increase of variable costs thus
increases68. As variable costs of n transits is defined to be the sum of variable costs of n -
1 transits plus the marginal cost of the nth transits the property concerning congestion of a
given option is reflected in the variable cost structure. In addition, variable costs comprise
externalities that are a function of quantities of transits, as pollution for instance, or safety.
We assume that the investment option has higher fixed costs and lower variable costs
(and, hence, lower marginal cost) over the relevant demand range than the status quo
option. This assumption does not imply much of a loss of generality: If the investment
option has higher fixed costs and higher variable costs then do not invest; The investment
option is unlikely to have lower fixed costs as the status quo option as the latter does not
bear capital costs (=sunk cost) as compared to the investment option.
Now, suppose investing could be done in an instant and the demand curve for the year
ahead was known. Suppose that, as discussed in Section 2.2, both options would be
operated by charging the efficient price. We may then calculate net benefits for each
option for that year by subtracting total costs from total benefits.
If net benefits of the status quo option is larger than that of the investment option then do
not invest for the difference in value would otherwise be destroyed. In this case decision
making is deferred by one year in which, then, the analysis ought to be conducted again.
If net benefits of the investment option is larger than that of the status quo option then
invest for not only is value created for that year but for the years thereafter as a
consequence of the assumption that demand is monotonically increasing with respect to
time69. The reasoning is this: (1) As demand is monotonically increasing with respect to
time the number of transits in both, the status quo option and the investment option, is
going to increase for the consequent years. (2) Each additional transit yields the same
68 See Section 2.2.
69 See assumption 3, Section 2.1.
gross benefits (as measured by the consumer's willingness to pay curve) to both options
but costs less in the investment option than in the status quo option as the investment
option has lower marginal costs than the status quo option. It follows (3) that each
additional transit yields larger net benefits to the investment option than the status quo
option. On the basis of(l) and (3) we can, then, deduce that net benefits of the
investment option are larger than net benefits of the status quo option for the years
thereafter and that the difference is growing with respect to time. Q.E.D.
Conversely, given the technology of both options and assuming the shape of the demand
curves to be constant, a critical demand curve can be determined for which the investment
option is superior. At a given point in time the actual demand curve could then be
compared to the critical demand curve. Based on projections of demand, a year could be
determined when investment should take place. Dropping the assumption about demand
curves having the same shape necessitates talk about a set of critical demand curves but
does not change the approach substantially 70. The reasoning is graphically depicted in
Figure 2.3.7
The situation is slightly more complicated (and realistic) if we drop the assumption of
instant investment. Suppose that the investment period is t years and there is no use
before year t. We would decide to invest now based on the projection of the demand
schedule t years hence whether net benefits of the investment option are larger than those
of the status quo option, then. Conversely, given a set of critical demand schedules and
projections of demand schedules we could determine now in which year it is optimal to
invest: t years before the net benefit of the investment option is larger than the net benefit
of the status quo option.
70 The seed idea for this approach is to be found in: A. Harberger "Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Transportation Projects" Project Evaluation, University of Chicago Press.71 Source: G. Jenkins, A. Harberger "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Decisions" Harvard Institute for
International Development, Chapter 5, Figure 5-4.
FIGURE 2.3: TIMING OF PROJECTS
WHEN POTENTIAL BENEFITS ARE
A CONTINUOUSLY RISING FUNCTION OF CALENDAR TIME





This decision principle is, then, described by the following algorithm (Suppose we are in
year k and we want to decide between starting construction to implement the investment
option, which takes t years, or not do so):
1. Forecast demand for the year k + t (in order to determine benefits);
2. Forecast the cost situation for operating in the investment option and
for operating in the status quo option in the year k + t;
3. Calculate expected net benefits for each option in the year k + t by
subtracting total costs from total benefits for that year;
4. Choose option with larger net benefits: If operating in the investment
option is expected to yield larger net benefits in year k + t then start
construction now; If operating in the status quo option is expected to
yield larger net benefits in year k + t then do not start construction now
and conduct the same analysis in year k + 1 for year k + t + 1 (i.e.
defer decision making for one year); In the latter case we operate in
the status quo option in the year k + t.
This method has two major advantages over the traditional method of setting up a
cashflow table to model the whole life of the project:
Firstly, the forecasting requirements are considerably less. In the traditional method the
states of affairs have to be predicted for the whole life of the project, which often means
making predictions for more than 30 years into the future. Such long term predictions are
unconvincing. In our method, on the other hand, we only need to predict the states of
affairs t years (the number of years it takes to implement the investment option) into the
future to choose between starting construction now or defering the decision by a year. As
t is always less than the life of the project and forecasts are, generally, more reasonable the
sooner the states of affairs forecasted, our decision method is based on higher quality
forecasts and, hence, yields higher quality decisions.
Secondly, our method ensures optimal timing of investment. Due to the lumpiness of
investment in transportation projects the timing of investment is not trivial. If the
investment is done too early then (conceptual implication), in the beginning of the project,
the benefits accrued due to lower variable costs and additional transits are outweighed by
the cost of capital. Conversely, if the investment is done too late, then the benefits
foregone by higher variable cost and reduced transits (in the status quo option relative to
the investment option) outweigh the cost of capital. Thus, a cashflow table for a proposed
investment that indicates a positive NPV, is consistent with a suboptimal project relative
to timing. Our method, on the other hand, as it is conducted on a year by year basis,
ensures optimal timing: Start operation in the year in which net benefits of the investment
option is larger than in the status quo option.
The simple decision procedure outlined above critically rests on the assumption that there
is only one investment option. While investment options are, ex hypothesi, lumpy, there
generally are different options with respect to technology available. In fact, there is a
tendency in the design of options to uncritically accept technological constraints and, thus,
to choose suboptimal technology. It is our goal now to extend the above decision
criterion to choosing among disparate technology choices, and in the same process
facilitate the design process of options.
Note firstly that the question of which investment option to choose arises only if in the
given year at least one investment option is more efficient than the status quo option.
Otherwise no judgement is required. This point is very important, practically, for being
able to wait invariably improves the information situation and the technological options
available. Thus, unless at least one investment choice is more efficient than the status quo
option, defer decision making.
We begin with special cases. Suppose at least one investment option to be more efficient
in year n and all investment options to have the same capacity, or more precisely, the same
cost structure at capacity and the investment to extend the capacity thereafter is expected
not to be affected critically by which investment option is chosen. The investment options
differ with respect to their cost structure up to capacity. Then we compare different
investment options in the following way: Based on projections of demand schedules (from
the year in which at least one investment option dominates the status quo option) we
determine the net present value for each technology option implemented at optimal time
and operated economically optimal. In this case a cashflow table has to be set up for the
relevant time period in which the cashflows are listed as they accrue. Note that the
residual value of the project at the end of its' life is assumed to be the same for each
option at the moment.
Then, the decision criterion is: Choose option that maximizes net present value.
Unfortunately, rather more extensive demand projections are required in the comparison
between investment options than in the comparison between the status quo option and an
investment option. A trivial case, probably not without application though, is that one
option dominates all others over the demand range considered. Then, the decision
criterion is: Choose the dominant option.
Let us drop the assumption that the costs/benefits of the extension of the investment
option is not affected by the choice of option. The consequences of doing so are
mitigated as the costs and benefits tend to accrue far into the future and, thus, discounted
for time, have a relatively small impact in present value terms. Also, the technological
options at that point in time in the future are likely to be different due to progress.
Nevertheless, properly adjusted, these effects of the options should be taken into
consideration.
Let us now drop the assumption of all investment options having similar capacities. Often
there is the choice between making one large investment or investing in stages (though still
lumpy). with the former having a higher capacity than the latter. In this case we cannot
compare the net present values by discounting net cashflows until demand reaches
capacity as different demand ranges, or more commonly put, different quantites of periods
of time, are covered by the respective options. We want to achieve comparability between
such options. The solution is to create compound options with similar capacity. Then, as
above (from the demand schedule onwards in which at least one investment option
dominates the status quo option) we calculate the net present value based on demand
projections.
Note, however, two difficult to quantify advantages of a composite option compared to a
non-composite option. Firstly, the number of technological options increase through time
and, secondly, the demand information improves. As the time periods considered are
long, these are substantial advantages. It is often argued against a composite option that
the overall cost is higher than that of the single option. While this might be the case, much
care must be taken to discount cost properly for time. Also, one would want to consider
only real and not nominal cost increases. Though painfully obvious, to make this point is
warranted due to the popularity of disregarding it.
2.4 SUMMARY OF PART I
In Part I we have discussed the design and evaluation of projects in general and
transportation projects in particular.
We began in Chapter 1 by defining the concept of a project. The difference between the
economic and financial perspective on projects was discussed. The prevalent method for
comparing cashflows at different times, the net present value rule, was described and
defended. The prevalent treatment of risk was described. A not so prevalent finding was
that from a government's perspective the riskiness of outcomes of a given project does not
constitute a cost in the case that the project, in a certain sense, is only a small part of the
overall portfolio of projects in the economy 1". This finding will be used extensively in Part
72 This condition might not be satisfied for large projects in small economies. We will discuss this issue
for the tunnel project in Argentina in Part II.
II. We then went on to consider implications of organization theory for the design of
projects. We used the concepts of principal and agent to investigate methods for
minimizing costs due to different objective functions of entities involved in a project.
Finally, we defended cost-benefits analysis against the criticisms that outcomes are
impossible to predict and monetize by pointing out that, in a precise sense, this is done
inevitably by taking a decision.
In Chapter 2 we derived design and evaluation implications from the salient properties of
transportation infrastructure projects. Using microeconomic theory we investigated the
difference in outcomes if such infrastructure is provided privately, i.e. optimized relative to
the financial perspective, or publically, i.e. optimized relative to the economic perspective.
We found there to be sizable potential for agency costs if such infrastructure is provided
privately. We listed benefits as well as other costs of private provision. We used the
findings to question the current trend of private transportation infrastructure provision.
We found that the judicious choice between public or private (or a hybrid version of the
two) provision requires a careful cost-benefits analysis. These findings are of no practical
importance to the analysis conducted in Part II. However, at a more advanced stage in the
formulation of the project they are certainly applicable and should receive due
consideration.
Of much practical importance, on the other hand, is the finding that it is a necessary
condition for a project to be implemented that it has positive net benefits in economic
terms if prized efficiently.
Finally, we derived concrete decision criteria with respect to technology and timing of
projects. We described and elaborated on a method that allows under certain and
prevalent conditions that only the states of affairs of the year at the start of operations of
the project need to be forecasted rather than the states of affairs for the whole life of the
project in order to choose the timing of an investment. This greatly reduces the forecasing
requirements and insures optimal timing as compared to the more traditional method of
setting up a cash-flow table for the life of the project. As forecasting time periods of more
than, say, ten years is unconvincing this is a major advantage over the traditional method.
We developed the idea of comparing technological options over demand ranges rather
than on the basis of demand projections as in the traditional method of cash flow tables.
To my knowledge this method is new. The advantage is that in the case of an option
being dominant over the relevant demand range no long term demand forecasts are
required to make a decision, which constitutes a considerable shortcut. The last two
methods are applied in Part II, where we investigate the economic feasibility of a tunnel
project.
PART II: APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK : THE MENDOZA - LOS ANDES
TRANSPORTATION CORRIDOR PROJECT
CHAPTER 3: INTRODUCTION TO THE MENDOZA-LOS ANDES
TRANSPORTATION CORRIDOR PROJECT
In the remainder we are going to apply the framework developed in Part I. We conduct a
cost-benefit analysis from the economic perspective of a particular transportation
infrastructure project: It has been proposed to substantially upgrade the transportation
link between Mendoza (Argentina) and Los Andes (Chile) 73 by complementing a winding
and avalanche-afflicted mountain route by a tunnel at lower altitude.
The flow chart in Figure 3-1 depicts the logical structure of Part II. The flow chart serves
as an overview and as a reference guide.
The Mendoza - Los Andes corridor is located in the region of 70 degrees west and 32
degrees south. The terrain is of markedly alpine character - the existing road is located in
the area of the Aconcagua, at an altitude of almost 7000m the highest mountain in South
America, and crosses a mountain pass with an altitude of 3185m. The extreme climate has
caused the corridor to be closed on average 30 days per year during the winter months.
The options to be discussed are intended to alleviate this problem by using a tunnel at an
altitude of approximately 2600m.
The Mendoza - Los Andes corridor serves as a connection between Argentina and Chile
and, indirectly, between Chile and Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil.
The geographic situation is depicted in Figure 3-2.
A sectional drawing of the corridor is displayed in Figure 3-3 (E.F.DP.190/191)
73 The economic perspective, then, is from the economy comprising the Chilean and the Argentine
econ onV.
FIGURE 3-1: FLOW CHART
Chapter 4
* Description of technological option
* Determination of cost structureI,
For each technological option,
determine marginal cost and total cost
as a function of quantity of transits:





















* Introduction to model
Chapter 6
Calculating net benefits as a function of demand
curve (For each technological option):
1) Equalize marginal cost and demand to obtain
the quantity of transits, p, for that demand:
p =j(d)
2) Calculate gross benefits: gb = k(d,p)
3) Calculate total cost: tc = g(p)
4) Net benefits is gross benefits - total costs: nb(d)
Then: Determine optimal technological option
over range of demand
Timing of investment option
1) Determine optimal timing
for investment for the five
demand scenarios;
2) Analyze stochastic demand
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Argentina has a population of about 33 million with 40% living in the capital Buenos
Aires. Argentina had a gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990 of $26 billion74 resulting in
a per capita GDP of $787 (this figure seems rather low). The centers of economic activity
are congruent with the centers of population, with the main center being in Buenos Aires.
The outlook for the growth of the Argentinian economy is promising: Prudent monetary
policy and a market based approach for the allocation of resources are being implemented.
The population of Chile in 1991 was 13.4 million. The main population centre is the
capital, Santiago de Chile, and the adjacent port, Valparaiso. The distribution of the
populations of Argentina and Chile is depicted in Figure 3-4 (E.F.D.73).
Chile had a GDP in 1993 of $41.7 billion (in 1988 $s), resulting in a per capita GDP of
$3111. The centers of economic activity are congruent with the centers of population,
with the main center being the Santiago de Chile/Valparaiso Area. Chile has a longer
history than Argentina of keeping inflation down and limit distortions in the markets. For
the same reason its' outlook on economic growth are promising.
Following a period of military conflict between Argentina and Chile ending in 1984, trade
between the two countries has been rapidly increasing - though, admittedly, from a modest
base of $195 million in 1985. Trade between Chile and Brasil, Parguay and Uruguay
follows a similar pattern. A histogram of trade between Chile and Argentina, and Chile
and Brasil, Paraguay and Uruguay is depicted in Figure 3-57". As Chile joined Mercosur
in 1996 barriers to trade will be reduced.
Growing economies and the liberalization of trade will result in an increase of trade. This
translates into an increase in demand for transportation in the area. Tourism, as it is
positively correlated with economic activity, is to be expected to contribute to this trend.
The transportation infrastructure currently in place is not designed to exploit the trade
74 World Bank "From Insolvency to Growth" International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
1993.
`• Source of Lhe data used: E.F.D.147/149i150/163
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potential created by the political and economic changes. It follows that there are large
benefits to be expected from infrastructure improvements.
As the Mendoza - Los Andes corridor is the shortest connection between the economic
centres of Chile and Argentina, Brasil, Uruguay and Paraguay, it absorbs the majority of
international transits. In 1994 all freight and 93.3% of passenger transits (both excluding
air transportation) between Chile and Argentina used the Mendoza - Los Andes corridor
(E.F.DP.43)76 . 85% of the Argentinian population is living in proximity to the axis
Buenos Aires - Mendoza - Los Andes - Santiago (E.F.D.70).
These facts evidence the extraordinary importance of the Mendoza - Los Andes
transportation corridor for regional economic development in general and suggests, in
particular, that an improvement of the link is only a question of time. Our goal in the
following, then, is to determine the optimal time and the optimal technology for an
improvement of the corridor, applying the methodology developed in Part I. Of course
the status quo is the base line for this analysis.
We investigate six technological options to operate the Mendoza - Los Andes
transportation corridor in detail:
1. Status Quo Option - transits 77 via existing road;
2. New Road Option - transits via low altitude road tunnel;
3. Train Shuttle Option - transits via road to low altitude tunnel and via
train shuttle through low altitude tunnel;
4. Alternative Shuttle Option - transits via road to low altitude tunnel and
via an alternative shuttle system through low altitude tunnel;
16 This "drastic" distribution of traffic among the binacional corridors might be partly explained by data
collection.
' A transit is a trip from Mendoza to Los Andes or vice versa.
5. Transandino Rail Option - transits by train shuttle through low altitude
tunnel;
6. Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option - transits by alternative shuttle
system through low altitude tunnel.
The technological attributes relevant for determining the cost structure for each option are
described in Chapter 4.
We consider the existing mountain pass and the proposed tunnel as one link, thereby
creating a natural monopoly situtation. As the assumptions 1-4 of a "transportation
project" as set out in Section 2.1 are also satisfied, the application of the framework (the
validity of which was "deduced" from these assumptions alone) to the Mendoza - Los
Andes transportation corridor is warranted.
Due to information constraints, the evaluation of the project is characterised by shortcuts
and simplifications and, thus, the economic analysis in parts degenerates into a financial
analysis. We remember from Section 1.2 that the difference between the economic and
financial analysis is a function of the impact of the project in the markets for inputs and
outputs, the degree of distortedness in the markets for inputs and outputs and
externalities. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to quantify this aggregate difference, or
in other words to conduct a thorough economic analysis. Note, however, in defense of
the analysis conducted that the difference between an economic analysis and a financial
analysis is to be expected to decrease as market distortions are reduced in the process of
market liberalization. Furthermore, major economic costs such as safety and the value of
time are considered in the analysis.
It follows that the difference between the analysis conducted and a more thorough
economic analysis does not vitiate the results of the analysis. If the project is found
attractive enough to warrant more research, further replacing financial by economic values
is certainly a good idea.
A distributive analysis, i.e. disaggregating costs and benefits of the options with respect to
whom they accrue, is far beyond the scope of this paper. The possibility of sufficiently
negatively affected entities with veto power, alone, indicates that a distributive analyisis
ought to be conducted if the project is found to be sufficiently attractive78 .
We proceed in four steps : In Chapter 4 the cost structure per year of the six options is
analysed. In Chapter 5 the benefits per year are estimated for given demand curves.
Some estimates are made as to future developments in demand, i.e. demand curves and
time are correlated. In Chapter 6 the results of Chapters 4 and 5 are synthesised yielding
net benefits per year for each option as a function of given demand curves, and assuming
demand scenarios, as a function of time. In Chapter 7 the results are discussed.
The main source document for the investigation is the "Estudio Prefactibilidad
Mejoramiento Conexion Internacional Zona Central (Chile) Y La Region Cuyo
(Argentina)" conducted by Consorcio Juan Pablo II (R&Q, Geoconsult, HYTSA) jointly
commissioned by the Argentinean and the Chilean governments. That document (referred
to by "E.F.") consists of four parts :
1. Informe Diagnostico Y Propuesta (Version Corregida), referred to as
E.F.DP. The string of symbols E.F.DP.13, then means, Estudio
Prefactibilidad, Informe Diagnostico Y Propuesta, page 13.
2. Estudio de Factibilidad Tecnica Tunel a Baja Altura, referred to as
E.F.T.
3. Estudio de Demanda, referred to as E.F.D
4. Evaluacion Economico-Financiera, referred to as E.F.EF.
78 See Sections 1.1, 1.2.
The analysis in this thesis could thus be described as thinking through the policy
implications of the facts as stated in the document - only minor additional assumptions are
made. The serious reader is encouraged to study the above document (although, we note,
that it is written in Spanish).
Before embarking on the analysis a satisfactory answer is to be provided for why an
additional feasibility study based on very similar data might be fruitful. The following is a
list of differences between the feasibility study conducted in E.F.EF. and our study which
justify the expectation of new insights :
1. In E.F.EF. the economic benefits of an investment option are
determined by the savings in operating costs relative to the status quo
option. In our analysis, the economic benefits of the investment option
are based on the willingness to pay of consumers of transits;
2. We consider three technical options ignored in E.F.EF.
3. In contrast to E.F.EF. we incorporate costs due to safety in the cost-
benefit analysis.
Note that this list is not intended to provide a comparative analysis of both approaches. It
does, however, warrant expending the effort to conduct an additional economic cost-
benefit analysis.
COST ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
4.1 GENERAL REMARKS - PARAMETERS APPLICABLE TO ALL OPTIONS
The complete set of assumptions made, calculations conducted and results for each section
is exhibited in tabular and diagramatic form in the Appendix and in the Figures. In the text
only the less obvious or more critical assumptions and results are discussed. For a more
detailed technical exposition consult E.F.T.
We assume that the variability of outcomes (risk) is not a cost, i.e. the project should be
evaluated with respect to expected net benefits, alone. Let us justify this assumption.
We argued in Section 1.4 that ifa government conducts many and statistically independent
projects and if the project is sufficiently small then risk should not be perceived as a cost.
The underlying reason is that each individual taxpayer has a small share in a large number
of projects that are statistically independent. In such a portfolio of projects risk of the
outcomes of the projects in aggregate is negligible. As risk of each individual project is
diversified away from the taxpayer's perspective, it is not perceived as a cost from the
taxpayer's perspective, and, derivatively, ought not to be perceived as a cost from the
government's perspective.
Thus, in order to justify our assumption we need to corroborate the claim that the stake
for each individual taxpayer in the Mendoza-Los Andes project is small enough as to be
diversified away in the overall portfolio. We conduct a "back of the envelope" type of
reasoning: The economy comprising the Chilean and the Argentinean economy has
approximately 46 million people; Assuming the ratio of taxpayers to non-taxpayers to be
1:3 (i.e. an average household of 4) yields 11.5 million taxpayers; In the "most expensive"
option, the New Road Option, yearly capital costs are estimated to be $500 million; It
follows that each taxpayer has a share of $43 of capital costs per year; This is small
enough as to be diversified away in his overall portfolio of public projects (the crucial
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step); Thus, no risk is perceived by the individual taxpayer, and derviatively, risk ought
not to be treated as a cost in the analysis.
At a later stage in the evaluation and design process of the project it might be advisable to
determine whether risk neutrality is indeed the right risk attitude to take, and if not, to
determine the expected variance of the outcomes for each option. At our stage of analysis
the argument is sufficiently plausible.
Note that, from a risk spreading perspective, it would be preferable to fianance the project
on the basis of what might be called the "Mercosur Infrastructure Development Fund", as
risk is spread among a larger number of taxpayers 79.
As discusseed in Section 2.3 fixed costs are those costs that accrue independently of the
quantity of transits, variable costs are those costs that are a function of quantity of transits.
All costs are given per year unless otherwise stated.
Whenever available economic prices are used rather than financial prices. All costs and
benefits are stated in real terms in 1995 United States Dollars (this unit is referred to in the
following by the symbol $). We assume that relative prices, i.e. the quotients of the prices
between any two goods, remain constant80.
The economic opportunity cost of capital (discount rate) in E.F.E. is assumed to be 12%
constant through time (E.F.E.22). This is consistent with the 12.68% estimate of the
economic opportunity cost of funds as conducted in "Financial and Economic Feasibility
of a Mobile Natural Gas Supply System for Rural Villages" (p.22) based on elasticities of
supply of funds by households, business, government and foreign and on elasticities of
demand of funds by households, business and government in Argentina.
79 An additional argument supporting the idea of such a fund is that benefits of the improved link would
also accrue to other Mercosur countries, in particular Brasil, Uruguay and Paraguay.
'0 Note that in E.F.T274 an inflation of 4% is considered in the prediction of the nominal cost at the end
of construction of each option. Dealing in nominal values is periluous, due to the difficulty of predicting
inflation. It clouds the essentially interesting information: Real cost. Is 10 million USD in 2010 a lot?
The economic opportunity cost of equipment is estimated by the conversion factor"' I
(E.F.E.61). This compares to a conversion factor of 1.098 in the above cited study. The
difference may be explained by difference of types of equipment in the respective projects.
We assume a conversion factor of 1.
The economic opportunity cost of construction is estimated by the conversion factor 0.89
(E.F.E.60). As for equipment, we assume a conversion factor of 1.
The cost of road maintenance and snow removal are assumed to be each $2500 per km
per year (E.F.DP.359). For simplicity, maintenance is regarded as a fixed cost.
The cost of travel time is included in the cost of vehicle operation (E.F.D 301). The cost
of waiting time at the shuttle terminal, which applies to all options but the Status Quo
Option and the New Road Option, is estimated by attributing 80% of the reduction in
operation cost at higher speeds as estimated in E.F. to time savings (E.F.D.301). This
results in the value of time of $15, $120, $20, $31.25 per hour for cars, busses, trucks and
the average vehicle, respectively. As waiting time is a minor factor, the modelling
assumption is sufficiently plausible.
Safety costs are expected to be critical as accidents are expected to be much more
prevalent in the Status Quo Option as compared to the other options and "accident
externalities could be as large as all other externality costs (of traffic) taken together" 3.
The costs of safety in our analysis comprise only the costs of expected fatalities for each
option. We distinguish fatality rates for traffic on road in the open, road in the tunnel, rail
in the open and rail in the tunnel. The fatality rates for a transit in a given option, then, is
a function of the length of its' sections of road and rail, in and out of the tunnel. The
prevalence of fatalities is predicted on the basis of historical data:
"' See Section 1.2; Financial value * conversion factor = economic value.
S2 D. Newberry "'Pricing and congestion : Economic principles relevant to pricing roads" Cost Benefit
Analysis, 2nd edition, ed. R. Layard, S. Glaister, p.396, CUP.
83 Sensationalist evidence for the relevance of safety in the form of a picture of a truck turned over by
strong winds is displayed in Appendix 4. Unfortunately, more helpful information about the link itself for
estimating the safety cost in the Status Quo Option is not available.
The fatality rate on roads in Colorado (U.S.A.) in 1989 were 2.5 per 100 million km84
While admittedly less than ideal, this figure is a plausible estimate for the fatality rate on
road sections in the open in the Mendoza - Los Andes transportation corridor as Colorado
has similar topography. We assume the fatality rates on open road to be 2.5 per 100
million km.
In Switzerland the fatality rates on motorways in the open and on motorways in tunnels
have been found to be similar"s . We assume the fatality rates on road in the tunnel to be
2.5 per 100 million km.
In Germany fatality rates on railroads average 10 per year86. The total quantity of
passenger kilometers in 1989 was 411.4487 (100 million km) resulting in 0.024 fatalities
per 100 million km travelled. As this is negligible relative to 2.5 as in the road case in
Colorado, we assume that the fatality rate on rail in the open is 0.
While the rate of accidents on rail in tunnels is to be expected to be lower than in the
open, as interaction with the environment (e.g. avalanches, animals) is reduced, the fatality
rate per accident is to be expected to be higher as the difficulty of rescue mission increases
and, in the case of fire, safe areas are less accessible. We estimate that the two effects
cancel each other out and assume that the fatality rate on rail in the tunnel is 0.
According to E.F. (E.F.DP.707) environmental impacts are not of first order importance.
We, therefore, do not consider environmental costs in our analysis. In higher per capita
GDP countries such as the U.S.A environmental costs would play an important role. As
the project is long-term and the per capita GDP of Argentina is to be expected to,
14 Source: Traffic Safety, 1989.
85 K. Suter, Bundesamt fuer Strassenbau, Bern "Sicherheit bei unterirdischen Strassenverkehrsanlagen"
Sicherheit und Risiken bei Untertagswerken, ETH-Symposium, 21./22. Maerz 1991.86 Source: H. Bohnenblust "Die Risikobeurteilung als Planungshilfe hinsichtlich der Betriebssicherheit
von langen Eisenbahntunneln".
87 Source: Eurostat "Transport: Annual Statistics 1970-1989" Statistical Office of the European
Community.
eventually, reach current U.S. per capita GDP it is advisable to question the assumption at
a later stage in the evaluation and design process.
We assume that the proportions of transits via the Mendoza - Los Andes corridor in the
categories cars, buses and trucks remain constant at 55:14:31, respectively. This
assumption is warranted as not much realism is lost as the proportions have been about
constant (cars : bus : truck (in per cent) in the years 1992, 93, 94 respectively: 55:14:31,
56:13:31, 56:13:31; E.F.D.63) and are projected to remain so (56:12:31 in the year 2010
with new tunnel; E.F.D.305,310,314) while the analysis is simplified considerably: We
conduct the analysis by calculating the costs of an average vehicle. Based on the costs of
operation of cars, buses and trucks, including safety, time, fuel and maintenance the costs
of operation ($/km) for the average vehicle are calculated.
We calculate the cost situation for each option for the range of demand between 200,000
and 4,000,000 transits per year in discrete steps of 200,000. Total quantity of transits in
1994 was 295,333.
The demand per day is calculated as a function of quantity of transits per year and a
distribution of transits over the year. The distribution of transits is obtained from Mr. M.
Boefer at Geoconsult and based on past distributions. We distinguish three periods in the
year: The high transit period, comprising the month of January (the summer period), with
peak demand; The medium transit period, comprising the months December, February and
March, with medium demand and the low transit period, comprising the period April to
November, with low demand. The distribution used is consistent with the one used in
E.F.EF. (E.F.EF.45). The fact that the link was historically on average 30 days closed
during the winter in the past has been considered in the prediction of the distribution of
transits throughout the year.
In the case that demand for the Mendoza - Los Andes corridor exceeds capacity during
the summer, it is assumed that the excess demand is re-routed via Paso Pehuenche. a
detour of approximately 750 km. The costs of re-routing are calculated for the average
vehicle. Note that the cost estimate for re-routing is on the high side: traffic from
Mendoza to Los Andes largely has Santiago de Chile or Valparaiso as destination,
reducing the detour by approximately 90 km. In the case that demand exceeds capacity
during the winter, for instance as a consequence of closure of the link due to snow, the
excess demand is re-routed via Paso Puyehue, as Paso Pehuenche is often closed then,
too. This results in a detour of approximately 2127 km. The extra cost estimated for re-
routing is on the high side as above and also: currently the route is closed due to snow
about 3 days at one time (Source : Mr. Boefer, Geoconsult) and while buses use Paso
Puyehue, many trucks do not, apparently incurring less cost waiting untill it reopens than
re-routing. The costs for re-routing do not include so-called pipeline costs such as
increased inventory as a consequence of unreliable transportation.
The expected costs due to congestion and closure are only calculated for the Status Quo
Option having a capacity of 5000 vehicles per day and a route that is expected to be
closed for approximately 15 days in the winter due to snow. The investment options each
have an estimated capacity of 10,000 (via new tunnel) + 5000 (via Status Quo Route)
vehicles per day, which is far beyond the demand range that needs to be considered to
make a decision between the Status Quo and the investment options. It is expected that
closure of the link due to snow is negligible in an investment option.
Furthermore, apart from costs due to congestion, the cost per transit is invariant with
respect to the quantity of transits on the link. For instance it is not captured that fuel
consumption for vehicles is positively correlated with the density of traffic. These
assumptions, then, imply the following marginal cost structures per day for the investment
options and the Status Quo Option.
The marginal cost curve for the investment options is depicted in Figure 4.1-1. Note that
the marginal cost curve (SI-SI') is constant. This is a consequenc of the absence of
congestion as discussed above.
The marginal cost curve for the Status Quo Option is depicted in Figure 4.1-2. The
marginal cost curve consists of three constant lines depending on which route the transit
takes place. In the summer (SSl-SS1') up to capacity the marginal cost is that of the Paso
Christo Redentor, i.e. the direct route from Mendoza to Los Andes. The transits above
the capacity of 5000 vehicles per day are re-routed via Paso Pehuenche at $581 per
transit. In the case of demand beyond capacity in the winter the case is analoguous to the
case in the summer with the only difference that the (constant) marginal cost beyond
capacity is higher, namely $1237, as the detour in question is larger (SS2-SS2'). The case
that the link is closed due to snow is described in the diagram by setting capacity equal to
zero.
We estimate the marginal cost curve of the options per year as a function of quantity of
transits per year on the basis of the marginal cost curve per day as presented above by
calculating the average per transit increase of variable cost for an increase of an additional
200,000 transits per year: The marginal cost for the transits between 1,000,000 and
1,200,000 transits, for instance, is estimated by [(total variable cost for 1,200,000 transits
- total variable cost for 1,000,000 transits) / (1,200,000 - 1,000,000)]. In the following
the term "marginal cost curve" refers to the marginal cost curve per year (a function of
quantity of transits per year).
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the marginal cost curve is crucial for the calculation of
net benefits in our model. In the following chapter we will estimate the cost structure and
and derive the marginal cost curve for each option.














4.2 STATUS QUO OPTION
4.2.1 DESCRIPTION
The status quo option refers to operating on the existing route with modest improvements:
A mountain road via the Paso Christo Redentor with an altitude of 3148m. The road has
a total length of 261 km of which 20 km are in flat, 46 km in hilly and 195 km in
mountainuous topography. The road is paved throughout.
There are plans (partly executed) on the Chilean as well as the Argentinean side to
upgrade the existing connection:
1. The road is to be repaved on large sections (E.F.DP.325);
2. The existing tunnel is to be upgraded (E.F.DP.327);
3. Avalanche protection is to be installed (E.F.DP.327);
4. Slow lanes are to be installed on the Chilean side (E.F.DP.327).
Operating on this upgraded route, then, is referred to as the Status Quo Option.
4.2.2 FIXED COSTS
The investment in the improvement of the link as described above are to be made
independently of the decision to build the new tunnel or not and thus have to be regarded
as sunk costs (though some of the investments occur in the future relative to 1996). The
costs for the existing infrastructure are sunk costs. Hence no capital costs accrue in the
Status Quo Option. Fixed costs thus comprise only the maintenance costs and snow
removal costs.
4.2.3 VARIABLE COSTS
The capacity is in E.F. estimated to be 5000 vehicles per day. The bottlenecks are the
existing high altitude tunnel and the hairpin curves ("caracoles") on the Chilean side.
There is conflicting evidence concerning this figure: The calculation for the capacity in
E.F. is based on a capacity of 600 vehicles per hour and 8.3 hours of operation of the link
suggesting that 5000 vehicles per day is less than the true capacity; Carl Martland (MIT)
claims that congestion is already occuring during peak demand of 3000 vehicles per day
suggesting that 5000 vehicles per day is an optimistic estimate of capacity. The capacity
is subject to a sensitivity analysis.
It is assumed that the route is closed due to snow for 15 days per year during winter
time".
The costs of operation per transit in reliable service and unreliable service (either
congestion or closure due to snow) are calculated on the basis of costs stated in Section
4.1.
4.2.4 SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
The cost structure is displayed numerically in Appendix 4.2.4. The results are displayed
graphically in Figure 4.2.4.
The graph depicts average fixed cost, average variable cost, average total cost and
marginal cost in $ per transit as a function of total quantity of transits per year. As the
only fixed costs in the Status Quo Option are maintenance and snow removal costs, and in
particular no capital costs as in the investment options, average fixed cost per transit are
negligible and coincide with the x-axis. In the virtual absence of average fixed cost per
transit the average variable cost per transit coincides with average total cost per transit
and is therefore concealed by it.
ss Source: Mr. M. Boefer, Geoconsult.





















As is to be expected due to congestion, the marginal cost curve is upward sloping. The
precise shape of the marginal cost curve, though, might come as a surprise. The key for
understanding the shape is provided in Appendix 4.1 in the section titled "transits per day
as a function of transit period and quantity of transits per year". In particular, the table
reveals when the assumed daily capacity of 5000 transits is reached during peak, medium
and minimum demand (referred to as high, medium and low transit period, respectively).
No congestion occurs on the link up to an annual quantity of transits of 1,000,000. Thus
the marginal cost curve is flat up to 1,000,000 transits per year.
At the quantity of transits of 1,200,000 per year the demand for quantity of transits
exceeds the capacity by 1000 per day. These 1000 vehicles incur costs of $581 by re-
routing via Paso Pehuenche rather than incurring $223 via Paso Christo Redentor, the
direct route. At 1,200,000 transits per year no congestion occurs during the medium and
low transit periods. As the high transit period only comprises one month (January) the
increase in marginal cost is modest.
As the link is still congestion free during the medium and low transit periods at 1,400,000
annual transits and the additional congestion of 1000 transits per day is identical to the
increase in congestion between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 the marginal cost curve remains
flat between 1,200,000 and 1,400,000 transits per year.
At 1,600,000 annual transits congestion (=re-routing) of 777 vehicles per day occurs,
during the medium transit period. As the medium transit period comprises 3 months the
result is a sharper increase in marginal costs. (Congestion during the high transit period
increases (from 1,400,000 annual transits) by the same amount and therefore does not
increase marginal cost.)
Between 1,600,000 and 2,200,000 annual transits the increases in congestion are the same
as between 1,400,000 and 1,600,000 resulting in a flat marginal cost curve.
At 2,400,000 annual transits congestion occurs during the low transit period. As the
vehicles are re-routed via Paso Puyehue at a cost of $1237 during the the winter months
(June, July, August) and the low transit period comprises 8 months, the marginal cost
curve increases sharply.
Beyond 2,600,000 the increases in congestion and thus the increases in variable costs are
constant for each intervall of 200,000 transits and so is the marginal cost curve.
This explains the surprising shape of the marginal cost curve.
4.3 NEW ROAD OPTION
4.3.1 DESCRIPTION
The transportation corridor between Mendoza and Los Andes is identical to in the Status
Quo Option except that the section between Puente del Inca (Argentina) and Juncal
(Chile) is connected by a road tunnel of 26.05 km length (E.F.T.068). The tunnel consists
of two tubes each with two lanes and one directional traffic per tube. As the geology is
expected to be such that using tunnel boring machinery is inappropriate, the more costly
and time consuming, traditional method of blasting is to be used.
The road has a total length of 259 km of which 45 km are in flat (including the tunnel), 47
km in hilly and 167 km in mountainuous topography.
The route is displayed in Figure 4.3.1-1 (E.F.T.14)
The configuration of the tunnel is displayed in Figure 4.3.1-2 (E.F.T.80)
NEW ROAD OPTION - MAP OF ROUTE
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Implementing the New Road Option is expected to take 19 years and total accumulated
cost (including capital cost during construction) at the end of year 19 are expected to be
$4180 million. Thus the capital cost per year during operation, then, is 12% of that or
$501 million. To this the maintenance cost of the tunnel ($2.3 million) and road ($0.8
million) are to be added.
4.3.3 VARIABLE COSTS
The capacity of the tunnel is limited to 1000 vehicles per hour as the sum of both
directions (E.F.T. 111). This limit derives from the ventilation system proposed to be
installed.
Ventilation is a major cost in the operation. As ventilation is correlated to quantity of
transits ventilation is regarded to be a variable cost calculated on a pro rata basis: [total
annual ventilation cost (calculated for 10000 vehicles per day)] / [365*10000] =
ventilation cost per vehicle.
4.3.4 SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
The cost structure is displayed numerically in Appendix 4.3.4. The results are displayed
graphically in Figure 4.3.4.
The graph is identical to the graph discussed in Section 4.2.4. The cost structure of the
New Road Option though is sufficiently distinct to warrant further discussion.
The average fixed cost per transit is a major factor in determining average total cost due
to large capital costs. The average marginal cost per transit is equal to the average
variable cost per transit and constant as no congestion occurs. The average total cost per
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FIGURE 4.3.4:
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transit, then, is downward sloping as the capital costs are distributed among a larger
number of transits.
As the remaining investment options have a qualitatively identical cost structure we refrain
from further discussion of the analouous graphs for the subsequently discussed investment
options. The average total costs of the options are compared in Section 4.8. The more
revealing net benefits of the options are discussed in Chapter 6.
4.4 TRAIN SHUTTLE OPTION
4.4.1 DESCRIPTION
The transportation corridor between Mendoza and Los Andes is identical to in the Status
Quo Option except that the section between Puente del Inca (Argentina) and Juncal
(Chile) is connected by a rail tunnel of 23.02 km length (E.F.T.15). The rail tunnel
consists of two single rail tubes. 8.45 km of the 23.02 km is constructed with open ceiling
(false tunnel). The balance is constructed with tunnel boring machinery. Using tunnel
boring machinery as compared to the traditional method of blasting to be used in the New
Road Option considerably reduces capital costs and time of construction.
In the shuttle operation, cars, busses and trucks are transported on flat-cars powered
electrically by locomotives between the two shuttle terminals located in proximity to the
respective tunnel portals. Extensive experience with this system exists as it has been
applied for some time in the Alps, for instance in the Loetschberg tunnel and Vereina
tunnel, Switzerland and the Boeckstein tunnel Austria. The Channel tunnel operates such
a train shuttle system in addition to the trains connecting the French and English rail
networks.
Using an electric powering system as compared to a combustion based powering system
as in the New Road Option has two advantages. Firstly, the supply of fresh air, which is
the critical issue in the determination of the capacity of the road tunnel, is unproblematic.
Secondly, a large percentage, approximately 60%, of the energy expended to move the
vehicle up from the Chilean to the Argentinian side is recouped in the braking process by
the trains from the Argentinian to the Chilean side.
The route consists of 24 km rail, operated by train shuttle, and a total of 232 km of roads
of which 18 km are in flat, 47 km in hilly and 167 km in mountainuous topography.
The route is displayed in Figure 4.4.1-1 (E.F.T.15)
The configuration of the rail tunnel is displayed in Figure 4.4.1-2 (E.F.T.089)
Note that the gradient of the route is 5% (E.F.T.148). According to Prof. H. Einstein
(MIT) it is highly implausible due to the low friction coefficient of steel on steel that a
route with gradient of 5% is optimal for a rail tunnel. Rail shuttle tunnels in Switzerland
do not exceed 2.5%.
4.4.2 FIXED COSTS
Implementing the train shuttle option is expected to take 11 years and total accumulated
construction cost are expected to be $1210 million, translating into capital cost per year of
$145.2 million per year of operation.
Investment in the transport park, mainly locomotives, is not regarded as a fixed cost but
assumed to vary with the quantity of transits on a pro rata basis.
The maintenance cost of the road portion of the link is calculated as above. The
maintenance cost of the tunnel, excluding maintenance of transport park, are $0.419
million.
FIGURE 4.4.1-1: TRAIN SHUTTLE OPTION - MAP OF ROUTE










In the E.F. capital costs and maintenance costs of the transport park as well as operation
costs are calculated to provide a capacity of 10000 vehicles per day. Clearly if the
quantity of transits are considerably lower, fewer locomotives will be acquired and less
electricity etc. will be consumed. In order to capture this relation in the model, we assign
1/10000 of the cost indicated in E.F. to each vehicle. This provides a bias in favor of the
option as a minimum capacity has to be maintained as waiting time otherwise becomes
unjustifiable. If the findings are favourable to this option these simplifying assumptions
will have to be dropped.
The cost as a consequence of the value of time on the rail portion of the transit are
calculated based on the value of time stated in Section 4.1 and average waiting and travel
time, 0.5 hour each.
4.4.4 SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
The cost structure is displayed numerically in Appendix 4.4.4. The results are displayed
graphically in Figure 4.4.4.
FIGURE 4.4.4: TRAIN SHUTTLE OPTION - COST STRUCTURE
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4.5 THE ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTION
4.5.1 DESCRIPTION
The Alternative Shuttle Option is identical to the Train Shuttle Option apart from the
powering system. While in the Train Shuttle Option conventional locomotives are used, in
the alternative shuttle option electrically powered "platforms" each carrying either 2 cars
or 1 bus or 1 truck are used. This type of powering system has not been implemented so
far and the information available thus has to be taken with "a pinch of salt". A picture of
such a platform is displayed in Figure 4.5.1.
The platforms are powered electrically so that, as in the Train Shuttle Option, a high
percentage, approximately 60%, of the energy expended to move the vehicle up from the
Chilean to the Argentinian side is recouped in the braking process by the platforms from
the Argentinian to the Chilean side.
There are two immediate advantages of the alternative shuttle system over the train shuttle
system. The frequency of service in the alternative shuttle system is higher as the
platforms carry only one or two vehicles resulting in an avoidance of waiting time. As the
friction coefficient of rubber on road (asphalt, concrete) is markedly higher than the
fricition coefficient fo steel on steel the gradient of 5% of the route is unproblematic.
The route is displayed in Figure 4.4.1-1 (E.F.T. 15).
The configuration of the alternative shuttle tunnel is displayed in Figure 4.4.1-2
(E.F.T.089).
FIGURE 4.5.1: ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTION - PICTURE OF
PLATFORM
4.5.2 FIXED COSTS
Implementing the alternative shuttle option is expected to take I I years and total
accumulated construction costs are expected to be $1025 million, translating into capital
costs per year of $123 million per year of operation.
As in the train shuttle, we consider capital costs and maintenance of the transportation
park to be a variable costs.
The maintenance costs of the road portion of the link is calculated as above. The
maintenance costs of the tunnel, excluding maintenance of transport park, are $0.474
million.
4.5.3 VARIABLE COSTS
As in the train shuttle case the capital costs and maintenance costs of the transportation
park are taken as variable costs and are calculated on a pro rata basis. The underlying
assumption that the transportation park is extended as demand rises, however, is very
plausible in the alternative shuttle case. Apart from this modelling assumption being more
plausible in the alternative shuttle case than in the train shuttle case, and more importantly,
there is a sizable real advantage of the Alterantive Shuttle Option: Capacity can be
increased practically continuously.
Due to the reduced loading and unloading (waiting) time the average total trip time is only
0.525 hrs.
The costs due to safety is assumed to be identical to the rail case.
The costs of operation and transportation park as estimated in E.F.T. appears to be rather
low at 5$ per transit for the shuttle portion of the transit (Prof. H. Einstein, MIT).
4.5.4 SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
The cost structure is displayed numerically in Appendix 4.5.4. The results are displayed
graphically in Figure 4.5.4:
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4.6 TRANSANDINO RAIL OPTION
4.6.1 DESCRIPTION
The Transandino Rail Option is not analysed in E.F.EF. In this sense, the option is created
by the Author.
In the Transandino Rail Option the existing right of way of the the old transandino railway
between Mendoza and Punta del Inca on the Argentinian side and between Juncal and Los
Andes on the Chilean side is to be rehabilitated. The section between Punta del Inca and
Juncal is as in the Train Shuttle Option. The terminals for the shuttle would be located in
Mendoza and Los Andes.
The old transandino railway has been out of service since 1983 and is in a very damaged
condition due to military action during the war between Chile and Argentina in 1984
(Source : Mr. Boefer, Geoconsult). The width of the transandino railway is 1000 mm as
compared to the standard "Spanish" width of 1676 mm in Argentina and Chile. It is
therefore to be expected that the cost of rehabilitation is to be substantial.
The obvious benefit of this option is that it affords a rail link between Argentina and Chile
and in particular between the economic centres Buenos Aires and Santiago de
Chile/Valparaiso.
4.6.2 FIXED COSTS
The capital costs for the Punta del Inca - Juncal portion is as in the Train Shuttle Option
(including cost of terminals). The costs for the rehabilitation of the tracks Mendoza -
Punta del Inca, Juncal - Los Andes is estimated at $7 million per km by Herrman Koehne
Ltd.. This estimate is derived on the basis of an actual rehabilitation of a railroad track: A
conversion of 26 km of single track out of service since 1950 into double track cost DM
275 million89 in 1990.
The maintenance costs for the Punta del Inca - Juncal portion is as in the Train Shuttle
Option. The costs of the maintenance for the tracks Mendoza - Punta del Inca and Juncal
- Los Andes is estimated at $10000 per km and year. This estimate is based on the results
of a cost-benefit analysis comparing track on ballast with track on concrete conducted for
the "Rhein-Main" project - a new rail link between Cologne and Frankfurt (estimated total
investment cost: $4 billion).
The costs of the transportation park is, as in the Train Shuttle Option assumed to be
variable.
4.6.3 VARIABLE COSTS
The capital costs and maintenance costs of the transportation park and operations costs
are directly proportionally extrapolated from 23 km service (Train Shuttle Option) to 255
km on a pro rata basis.
This is an even more tenuous approach than in the Train Shuttle Option: In order to keep
travel time satisfactory the transportation park has to be sizable (i.e. costs are
understated); As the electricity requirements and locomotive requirements for the flat/hilly
terrain between Mendoza - Punta del Inca and Juncal and Los Andes are taken from the
5% gradient section, costs are overstated. Note, though, that the divergence of costs due
to electricity is less than might be expected as approximately 60% of the energy expended
as a consequence of the gradient is recouped in the breaking process. If the Transandino
Rail Option looks attractive enough in this analysis to warrant further attention, then
developing a more realistic operating cost model is a high priority.
8 The DM 275 million disaggregate into: Railroad construction: DM 133 million; Signaling: DM 12
million; Bridges: DM 90 million; Engineering Services: DM 40 million.
Total travel time between Mendoza and Los Andes is 3.05 hrs.
4.6.4 SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
The cost structure is displayed numerically in Appendix 4.6.4. The results are displayed
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4.7 THE TRANSANDINO ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTION
4.7.1 DESCRIPTION
The Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option is not analysed in E.F.EF. In this sense, the
option is created by the Author.
The Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option is the natural combination of the Alternative
Shuttle Option and the Transandino Rail Option.
The Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option may be upgraded to provide through rail
service at "little extra cost". We do not pursue this issue any further.
4.7.2 FIXED COSTS
The capital costs for the portion Punta del Inca - Juncal is as in the Alternative Shuttle
Option. The capital costs for the portions Mendoza - Punta del Inca and Juncal - Los
Andes is assumed to be identical as in the Transandino Rail Option.
Capital costs and maintenance costs for transportation park are assumed to be variable.
Maintenance costs of the infrastructure is as in the Alternative Shuttle Option and
Transandino Rail Option for the respective portions.
4.7.3 VARIABLE COSTS
The capital costs and maintenance costs of the transportation park and operations costs
are directly proportionally extrapolated from 23 km service (Alternative Shuttle Option) to
255 km on a pro rata basis. For the same reasons as in the discussion of the Alternative
Shuttle Option this assumption is very much less problematic than in the Transandino Rail
Option.
Total average travel time between Mendoza and Los Andes is 2.55 hrs.
Costs due to safety is assumed to be identical to the rail case.
4.7.4 SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
The cost structure is displayed numerically in Appendix 4.7.4. The results are displayed
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4.8 COMPARISON OF AVERAGE TOTAL COSTS OF OPTIONS
We remember from Section 2.2 that using the decision principle "Choose option that
minimizes average total cost for the expected range of quantities of transits" may lead to a
suboptimal choice from the economic perspective because the quantity of transits is a
function of level of service; In other words, the demand side is ignored. However, if users
are to be made to pay their way, this result indicates the cost they should incur as a
function of quantity of transits. Before we incorporate the demand side into the analysis in
the next chapter we here investigate the options along the average total cost dimension.
As the results are only of limited usefulness, the discussion is brief.
The comparison of average total costs of the options is displayed numerically in Appendix
4.8 and graphically in Figure 4.8:
By inspection, we see that the Status Quo Option has the lowest average total cost up to
about 1.6 million transits per year. From 1.6 million to 2.5 million transits per year
operating the Alternative Shuttle Option provides the lowest average total cost. From 2.5
million to 4 million transits per year operating the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option
provides the lowest average total cost per transit. To help gauge these findings note that
in 1994 the actual quantity of transits was 295,333 vehicles. The prediction of demand is
conducted in detail in the following chapter.
The Transandino Rail Option is the worst of the investment options. This is explained to a
large extent by the high costs for the transportation park of operating a shuttle service for
about 260 km.
The New Road Option is superior to the Status Quo Option for more than 2.8 million
transits, i.e. when congestion is very painful already: about 70% of transits are re-routed
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This illustrates that considering average total costs does not provide the decision maker
with sufficient information: Given the high cost as perceived by the consumer of transits
(the driver) in the case of re-routing or congestion it is to be expected that the demand at
the same point in time is markedly higher in the New Road Option as in the Status Quo
Option 9 .
This discussion of average total costs ough to suffice as we will estimate the, more
revealing, net benefits for each option as a function of demand curves in Chapters 5 and 6.
9 We assume, of course, that the price perceived by the consumer is the economically efficient price and
not average total cost (See Section 2.2).
103
CHAPTER 5:
5.1 A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
In Sections 1.2 and 2.3 we developed a methodology for determining the economic
benefits of a project in general. As a proper understanding of the basic ideas involved is
crucial for an understanding of the analysis, the interpretation of the methodology to the
Mendoza - Los Andes transportation corridor is warranted. Such an interpretation will
also serve as an illustration to the discussion of Sections 1.2 and 2.3.
Consider Figure 5.1.
The vertical axis measures the price which each successive unit of transit (i.e. its
consumer) would be willing to pay. The horizontal axis measures quantity of transits.
The line DD', then, may be interpreted as indicating how much consumers are willing to
pay for transits, where the transits are ordered on the horizontal axis from left to right
according to the willingness to pay of the respective consumer of the transit. The line
DD' is referred to as demand or willingness to pay curve. As different consumers value
transits differently (and different transits differently) the demand curve is downward
sloping: For instance a manufacturer of tires in Mendoza earning an extra $1000 per
truckload in the Chilean market values the transit higher than a manufacturer of shoes who
only earns an extra $50 per truckload.
Note that the demand curve indicates the maximum amount the consumer is willing to pay
for that unit, i.e. the demander is indifferent between having that particular unit of transit
at that particular price or spending his money on whatever other goods and services are
available to him at their respective prices. Moreover, the alternatives in question may be
very complex. A consumer's willingness to pay for a transit may be determined by the
trade-off between the "purchase" of a transit and selling one's produce in the Argentinean









Argentinean in Mendoza). All these choices are reflected in the demand price or the
willingness to pay for that transit by that individual.
From these observations it follows that, given a price faced by the consumer, the demand
curve indicates the quantity of demand: All consumers willing to pay more than the price
will consume. The others will not consume. The quantity consumed, then, is the x-
coordinate of the intersection of y = price and the demand curve. Consider again Figure
5.1. At price P the demand curve DD' implies (conceptual implication!) that Q transits are
consumed. At the lower price P*, more transits, Q*, units are consumed. At price P the
gross benefits of the transportation link are measured by the area under the demand curve
from 0 to Q as this measures the value to the consumer. To obtain net benefits from the
collective perspective of the consumers subtract PxQ, i.e. total costs as perceived by the
consumer, from gross benefits.
In our analysis, though, we are not interested in costs from the consumers perspective but
from the economic perspective and we thus subtract total costs for that quantity of transits
as derived in Chapter 4 (in the section synthesis of costs).
Lastly, note that at a lower price the gross benefits are larger. In a sense the demand
curve contains all the information we need to know in order to determine the benefits of
the transportation link: All the value created by the transportation corridor in the market
of transits is measured by the area under the demand curve between 0 and the actual
quantity of transits.
Benefits that are not included in such an analysis are of the following type: As a
consequence of an improvement in the transportation link a car factory is built in Mendoza
creating 2000 jobs and paying wages that are 10% above the opportunity cost of labour.
The 10% of net benefits created in the labor market, or for that reason in any other market
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related to the output of the project, are not included in such an analysis91. Note, however
that the benefits due to the extra demand for transits as a consequence of the car factory
exporting to Chile are incorporated in the analysis.
Another benefit of the project which we do not incorporate is the reduction of the
probability of war between Argentina and Chile -the last one was in 1982- as increased
traffic as well as the project as such is to be expected to increase integration among both
countries.
As we do not include the above two types of benefits of the improvement of the link our
estimate of the benefits are likely to be on the low side. So, if the project is attractive in
our analysis then it is attractive if the above benefits are included. In the case that the
project is found to be not promising, the above benefits ought to be included in a next step
in order to determine whether that changes our verdict.
As argued above, all benefits of the project in the market for transits are captured using
the demand curve. This, then, leads us to a problem of information: How to predict how
many factories will be built or, more generally, how to predict future demand curves?
5.2 BENEFIT ANALYSIS APPLIED
We were reminded in the preceding section of both the importance and the difficulty of
predicting future demand curves. For that reason we will, in this section, derive gross
benefits as a function of demand curves, i.e. treating demand curves as an independent
variable, and discuss some approaches to estimate future demand curves, i.e. discuss some
approaches to correlate demand curves with calendar time. We defer any discussion as to
the probability distribution over future rates of growth until we synthesize benefits and
9' In fact, such benefits are ignored in our analysis of the Mendoza - Los Andes transportation corridor
due to a lack of not completely arbitrary estimates. Depending on the outcome of the analysis this
working hypotheses (benefits in external markets = 0) may need to be questioned.
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costs in the following chapter. This will clarify the information requirements to make a
justified choice among the considered options.
The shape of the demand curve for the average vehicle, i.e. the first derivative, is deduced
on the basis of predictions of quantities of transits as a function of toll in the year 2010 in
E.F.D (E.F.D.305-332). The calculations are displayed in Appendix 5.2-1. The demand
curve predicted for the year 2010 with respect to some assumptions is displayed in Figure
5.2-1 (the assumptions are not very interesting in this context as we are only interested in
the shape of the demand curve). The shape of the demand curve is assumed to be linear
and constant through time. This assumption is a prevalent practice in cost-benefit
analysis 92.
We describe demand curves using the concept of "demand equivalents". As this concept
has to my knowledge not been used in the literature, some care must be taken to define
its' meaning. Note that a demand curve, assuming that it is a line is uniquely defined by a
point in the price - quantity space. Conventionally, lines are described using the y-
intercept. For increased clarity we adopt a different convention: We define a demand
curve by its' intercept of the price = $277 line, i.e. the point (# of transits at that price,
$277). The x-coordinate is referred to as the demand equivalent. In the year 1994 the
cost per transit perceived by the consumer is estimated at $277 and the quantity of transits
were 295,333. Hence, the underlying demand curve is described by the demand
equivalent = 295,333.
The advantage of this way of defining the demand curve is this. As one has more
information about demand at the current price, it is to be expected that projections in
demand are of the following kind: Assume, for instance, that when the price for a transit
remains constant, we expect growth in quantitiy of transits of 10%. This is, then,
equivalent to saying that the demand curve expected for next year is the one described by
the demand equivalent of(1 + 10%)* 295333 = 324,866. The demand equivalent
92 For example, linear demand and supply curves are asssumed througout in: G. Jenkins, A. Harberger
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describes what would be the demand in a given demand situation were the price of transits
perceived by the consumer to be $277.
On the basis of the demand curve described, it is possible to estimate the quantity of
transits for different prices, and derivatively the gross benefits as a function of price. As
price is correlated to the type of technological option we choose, we can determine the
gross benefits for a given demand curve as a function of the option.
It should not be forgotten that using demand equivalents is only a neat way to describe
demand curves. It does not in any way solve the problem of predicting future demand
curves. The question remains how to reasonably predict growth rates of transits in the
Mendoza - Los Andes transportation corridor. In the remainder we will consider some
approaches.
We start by considering simple induction : The growth rates of transits via the existing
high altitude tunnel in the period from 1986 to 1994 have been -4%, 25%, 47%, 0.5%,
22%, -7%, 2% and 10%, per year respectively. The negative growth rate in 1993 is
attributable to an unusually severe winter that caused the link to be closed for extended
periods of time. A meaningful trend is not discernible.
The E.F.D. forecasts a growth rate of quantity of transits in the range of 3% (minimum) to
9% (maximum) (E.F.D.(201/202/222/223/260/261)) up to the year 2010. Then, assuming
that the tunnel is in place in 2010, it is assumed that the growth rates will be between 5%
and 12% up to 2015, between 5% and 10% up to 2020 and then between 2% and 10% up
to the year 2040. The forecast is based on a complex destination-origin model of traffic
flows based on current transportation and economic trends93. It is up to the reader to
judge the usefullness of annual demand growth forecasts 45 years hence. In the
93 One interesting finding in the destination-origin model is that exports from Argentina to the Pacific
Rim countries constitute only 8% of all exports through the Mendoza customs (read: via Mendoza -Los
Andes corridorXE.F.D.93). This controverts popular opinion that Pacific Rim trade will have a major
impact on demand for transits.
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terminology developed in chapter 1.4, the E.F.D. is taking the "inside view". Let us now
consider an "outside view".
One way to forecast demand of transits is to consider trade as a main cause of
international traffic. Since E.F.D. was compiled, Chile has joined Mercosur9 4. Note that
this state of affairs is not explicitly considered in the E.F.D. This is an example of the
problems with focussing on extrapolating from current trends. It is plausible to expect
that trade between Chile and other Mercosur members will develop similarly to trade
among Mercosur members so far (what was referred to in Section 1.4 as "the class of
cases chosen to be similar"): Since Mercosur's inauguration in 1991 trade among member
countries has increased by 50%, 29%, 20%, 31% in the years '90 to '91 ... '93 to '94,
respectively". Unfortunately, no helpful information is available as to the correlation
among trade and international traffic or, in particular, transits demanded on the Mendoza -
Los Andes transportation link 6 . What can be said is this: Assuming (1) that trade
between Chile and Mercosur in the period between 1996 and 2000 behaves similarly to
trade among Mercosur countries from from 1990 to 1994, (2) a direct linear correlation of
trade and traffic and (3) a proportional distribution of traffic among the different
international transportation corridors, implies annual growth rates for the period of 1996
to 2000 of about 30%.
A basis for a longer term prediction of demand for transits for the Mendoza - Los Andes
corridor is provided by comparing future traffic in southern South America to past traffic
in another common market, the European Community (EC). Let us compare Chile with
Spain and Mercosur with the EC and explore traffic between Spain and the EC to derive
expectations about future traffic between Chile and Mercosur. After six years of
negotiations Spain became a full member of the EC in 1986 and was granted a
94 Source: The Economist, June 29th 1996
95 Source: J. Ocampo, P. Esguerra "The Andean Group And Latin American Integration" ed. Bouzas, Ros,
Economic Integration in the Western Hemisphere, undp.
96 Linear regression analysis on the available data indicates that for a 1% increase in trade, transits
increase by 0.00263% with an r-squared of 0.0053, i.e. no correlation (see Appendix 5.2-3 and Appendix
5.2-4). We ignore this result by distrusting the trade figures.
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transitionary period of seven years to align its laws and regulations with the EC
directives"9 . Considering the remaining trade barriers between Chile and Mercosur and, at
best. a medium to long term prospect of their removal98 it is plausible to compare the
situation of Spain with respect to economic integration into the EC in 1980, when
negotiations started, to the situation of Chile with respect to economic integration into
Mercosur in 1996.
Now, the average annual growth rate of freight transportation crossing the Pyrenean
mountains, i.e. transportation between Spain and central European countries, from 1986
to 1989 was 15%". Thus, the analogy suggests, using the above assumption (3) and
assuming (4) that the price of transportation in real terms remained sufficiently similar,
that annual growth rates in freight transportation between Chile and Mercosur will
increase on average by about 15% over the time period 2002 to 2005. Assuming (4)
identical growth rates for passenger transportation, the analogy then suggests the same
conclusion for overall transportation. It is plausible to expect that growth rates before
that are not going to be lower which leads us to expect that growth rates from 1996 to
2005 are converging to 15% from above.
An even longer term prediction of demand for the Mendoza - Los Andes transportation
corridor is provided by comparing Chile with Italy. This might be an even better analogy
than Spain, as many goods transported through the Alps from central Europe to italy go
on to other mediterranean countries by ship, which compares closely to Mercosur access
to the Pacific via Chilean ports.
97 Source: M. Galy, G. Pastor, T. Pujol "Spain: Converging with the European Community" Occasional
Paper 101, International Monetary Fund.
98 "... Mercosur has much work ahead. .... Chile ... has negotiated exemptions from completely free trade
in wheat and flour for up to 18 years."; Source: The Economist June 29th 1996.
99 Calculations based on data from: "European transport trends and infrastructural needs" The European
Conference of Ministers of Transport (1995), p.50
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Italy joined the EC in 1957100. The average and fairly constant annual growth rates of
transalpine freight traffic from 1970 to 1989 through France, Switzerland and Austria
were 7.8%, 2.5% and 7%, respectivelyl01. The low growth rates offfreight traffic through
Switzerland is explained by Swiss transit policies increasing the cost of transit relative to
France and Austria. By analogy, with the above assumptions in place, then, it is suggested
that growth rates of demand for transits for the Mendoza - Los Andes transportation
corridor in the period from 2006 to 2027 is about 7%.
In Appendix 5.2-2 the correlation of demand equivalents, i.e. demand curves, and calendar
time assuming the above demand scenarios is derived: (annual growth rates of demand (at
$277)) of 3% - the minimum predicted by the E.F.; 7% - the medium and most likely
predicted by the E.F; 12% - the maximum predicted by the E.F; 30% - suggested by
Mercosur growth rates in trade and, finally, 15% until 2005 and 7% thereafter - suggested
by the Mercosur - European Community analogy. The results are displayed graphically in
Figure 5.2-2.
Figure 5.2-2 correlates demand equivalents and calendar time as a function of the above
defined annual growth rate scenarios. The figure is self-explanatory.
As noted in the beginning of this section we defer any discussion as to the probability
distribution over future rates of growth until we synthesize benefits and costs in the
following chapter as this will clarify the information requirements to make a justified
choice among the considered options and minimize idle speculation.
'00 P. Vanicelli "Italy, Nato and the European Community" Harvard Studies of International Affairs, No.
31, 1974.
lot Calculations based on data from: European Conference of Ministers of Transport "European transport
trends and infrastructural needs" OECD, p.50
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SYNTHESIS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS
6.1 - 6.8 NET BENEFITS IN ABSOLUTE TERMS
This section serves as reference to the calculations conducted in the Appendix:
The calculations of net benfits for each option are displayed in Appendices 6.2 to 6.7 and
are summarized numerically in Appendix 6.8-1 and graphically in Appendix 6.8-2. The
method of calculations is set out briefly in Appendix 6. 1.
The discussion of net benefits is conducted in the following section.
6.9 NET BENEFITS RELATIVE TO THE STATUS QUO OPTION
In Chapter 4 we have determined the cost structure for each of the six of the technological
options considered for the Mendoza - Los Andes transportation corridor per year. In
Chapter 5 we developed a method to determine gross benefits of the corridor per year
given a demand curve and price for transits and investigated ways to forecast demand for
the future. In this chapter we will synthesize the costs and benefits for each option to
derive net benefits.
In order to calculate the net benefits for a given option and a given demand curve we have
to make assumptions in the model concerning the price perceived by the consumer of
transits. (Remember from the discussion in Section 5.1 that the quantity of transits
consumed is a function of the demand curve and the price.) We assume that the price
perceived by the consumer is the economically efficient price, i.e. the y-coordinate of the
intersection between the marginal cost curve and the demand curvei2°'. The marginal cost
curve and the demand curve are lines based on linear regressions on the data sets. There
are two different reasons why this is a good assumption to make in the model.
102 See Section 2.2 for why this is the efficient price.
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CHAPTER 6:
Firstly, the assumption is sufficiently realistic in the absence of tolls. The consumer of
transits perceives the major part of the marginal costs: fuel; time costs; safety costs; wear
and tear of the car, truck or bus on both the direct route and the indirect route in the case
of congestion; maintenance costs of the road are, arguably, passed on through the
gasoline tax; operation and maintenance cost of a shuttle service could and should be
charged to the user appropriately.
The marginal cost curve can be transformed into a level-of-service (LOS) curve from the
transportation systems analysis perspective. The LOS variables that we consider, then, are
out of pocket costs, time costs and safety costs 10 3 . The relationship between the marginal
cost curve and the LOS curve, then, is this: The higher the marginal cost the lower is the
LOS for that transit. As in our model the quantity of transits is a function of the marginal
cost curve, it follows that we include the transportation systems phenomenon that quantity
of transits is a function of LOS.
Secondly, with this assumption in place we can give a lower bound on when investment
might make sense economically, as the assumption constitutes an idealization from the
economic perspective.
Based on the assumption we, then, calculate net benefits for each option as a function of
demand equivalents in the following way (Consider Figure 6.9-1): (1) We determine the
quantity of transits for a given demand equivalent and marginal cost curve (i.e.
technological option) as the x-coordinate of the intersection of the demand curve and the
marginal cost curve (Point C in Figure 6.9-1); (2) We calculate gross benefits as the area
under the demand curve up to the quantity of transits (Area A-C-D-E in Figure 6.9-1);
(3)We calculate total costs for that quantity of transits by multiplying average total costs
for that quantity of transits (as determined in Chapter 4) with the quantity of transits (Area
103 An important LOS variable that we do not consider is the reliability of the transportation link in the
different technological options. For instance, the New Road Option is more reliable than the Status Quo
Option as travel time is known with a higher degree of certainty due to possible congestion or closure
during the winter in the latter. Reliability ought to be included in the next step of the analysis.
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F-B-D-E in Figure 6.9-1); (4) We subtract total costs from gross benefits to obtain net
benefits (as a function of demand equivalents and technological option).
The comparison of net benefits of the options as a function of demand equivalents is
displayed diagramatically in Appendix 6.8-2. In order to compare the net benefits of the
investment options to the status quo option, the base case, as a function of demand
equivalents we subtract the latter from the former, to obtain relative net benefits for each
investment option. The calculations are displayed in Appendix 6.9-1. The results are
displayed in Figure 6.9-2.
Figure 6.9-2, in conjunction with Figure 5.2-2, correlating demand equivalents and time,
contains the main conclusion of our model:
Figure 6.9-2 indicates that up to a demand per year described by a demand equivalent of
approximately 1,400,000, the net benefits per year of the Status Quo Option are larger
than for any of the five investment options. Over the demand range from 1,400,000 to
2,000,000 demand equivalents the Alternative Shuttle Option dominates all other options.
For demand greater than 2,000,000 demand equivalents the Transandino Alternative
Shuttle Option dominates all other options. Thus, according to the model, the only three
options that need to be considered further are the Status Quo Option, the Alternative
Shuttle Option and the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option. These are highlighted
accordingly in Figure 6.9-2. The New Road Option, Rail Shuttle Option and Transandino
Rail Option have less net benefits over the entire range of demand.
How, then, on the basis of the model do we decide between the two non-dominated
investment options: The Alternative Shuttle Option and the Transandino Alternative
Shuttle Option? As discussed in Section 2.3, it is conceptually required to derive the net
present value by setting up a cash flow table on the basis of demand projections for, say,
the next 50 years and factor in the effects of each investment option on the benefits and
costs of the subsequent investment.
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In our case the correct decision between the two options is clear by inspection: At the
modest demand growth rate of 5% per year the Alternative Shuttle Option would
dominate the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option for only seven years, the period of
time for demand to grow from 1,400,000 to 2,000,000 at 5% per year. It is then plausible
to claim that the net present value of operating the link up to 1,600,000 demand
equivalents in the Status Quo Option and then implementing the Transandino Alternative
Shuttle Option is larger than operating the link up to 1,400,000 demand equivalents in the
Status Quo Option and then implementing the Alternative Shuttle Option. Furthermore,
considering subsequent investments, the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option seems at
least on par.
Thus, we have determined which of the five investment options considered is optimal
according to the model: The Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option. That leaves the
question of timing: When is it optimal to start digging the tunnel? Theoretically, as
implementing the option is expected to take 11 years, the answer is 11 years before the
demand curve described by the demand equivalent of 1,600,000 occurs, as from then on
(demand is monotonically increasing through time) the Transandino Alternative Shuttle
Option dominates the Status Quo Option. In the terminology of Section 2.3, then,
1,600,000 is the critical demand. Clearly, this only shifts the question to when that is
expected to occur. In order to answer this question we have to forecast demand.
Assuming the low estimate of annual future growth of the E.F. of 3% it implies that the
critical demand is to occur in the year 2040, and construction thus ought to start in the
year 2029 (by which time new technological options will have certainly appeared).
Assuming the medium estimate of annual future growth of the E.F. of 7% implies that the
critical demand is to occur in the year 2019, and construction thus ought to start in the
year 2008.
Assuming the high estimate of annual future growth of the E.F. of 12% implies that the
critical demand is to occur in 2009, and construction thus ought to start in the year 1998.
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Assuming the growth pattern suggested by past trade increases in Mercosur, i.e. 30% per
year, implies that critical demand is to occur in 2000. and thus construction ought to have
started in 1989.
Assuming the growth pattern suggested by the Mercosur - European Community analogy,
i.e. 15% per year until 2005 and thereafter 7%, implies that critical demand is to occur in
2007, and thus construction should start in 1996, i.e this year.
So, while the optimal technological choice is largely independent of our expectations of
future demand, the timing choice is not.
In circumstances when one is not sure about ones expectations of future states of affairs, it
is often helpful to conduct a critical value analysis. The model calculates that for it to be
optimal to start construction in 1996 growth rates of demand for at least 13.5% per year
for the next 11 years have to occur. Is that a plausible expectation? We see that the
available evidence is ambivalent: The analogy with the European Community and past
trade figures in Mercosur suggest it to be plausible while the predictions of the E.F.
indicate the contrary (if this were not the case the critical value analysis would not be of
additional help, anyway). Thus, the critical value analysis does not provide additional
insights that would facilitate decision making.
It seems that the only option left apart from more careful demand forecasting is to assign a
probability distribution to the different scenarios based on the relative confidence in each
of their justifications. This approach is greatly simplified in our framework of analysis on
a per year basis as compared to setting up a cashflow table: to make a decision we only
need to predict growth rates for 11 years into the future. Let us go through the reasoning
for this year, 1996, for a simple expected value analysis. The reasoning is then readily
applicable to subsequent years.
In the end of 1996 we have to make the choice between (A) deferring the decision for
another year or (B) starting construction so that the Transandino Alternative Shuttle
121
Option is operational in the beginning of year 2008. Suppose, for reasons of exposition,
that based on the evidence we believe there to be a 50% chance of a growth rate of 13.5%
for the next 11 years and a 50% chance of a growth rate of 7%. As demand is expected to
increase monotonically through time we only need consider the expected value for the
year 2008, since if the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option is expected to dominate in
2008 it will also be expected to dominate thereafter and if it is expected to not dominate
the decision is simply deferred to next year (when the decision to build would
operationalize the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option in 2009). Given that the
growth rate is 13.5%, the demand equivalent in year 2008 is 1,816,000 for which the
model predicts (see Figure 6.9) additional benfits valued at approximately $100 million if
the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option is in place rather than the Status Quo Option.
On the other side, given that the growth rate is only 7%, which translates into a demand
equivalent of about 400,000 in the year 2008, approximately $400 million are destroyed
by operating in the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option rather than the Status Quo
Option'0 4. Thus, we expect a 50% chance of gains of $100 million and a 50% chance of
losses of $400 million if we chose to start construction in 1996 rather than delay the
decision for a year. As the expected value is $-150 million we would be advised to delay
the decision for a year. In the following year the same analysis can then be conducted
taking into consideration improvements in demand forecasts and in the technological
options available.
Let us now generalize the expected value analysis from discrete probability distributions
over states of affairs to continous probability distributions: For the purpose of illustration,
we think through the implications of the expectation, not implausible, that the probability
is normally distributed skewed by -0.50 between 3% and 30%. This expectation on future
growth is described graphically in Appendix 6.9-2. To do this we apply a method called
'04 Note that we assume that construction, once started, is not slowed or in any other way altered. This is
not so implausible assumption considering the "self-dynamic" projects feature even at the planning stage.
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Monte-Carlo Analysis 5os: The project is realized 500 times. In each realization a random
number is generated and mapped - on the basis of the expected probability distribution to a
particular growth rate for the next 11 years 10 6, on the basis of which the net benefit of the
Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option relative to the Status Quo Option in the year 2008
is calculated. The equation of net benefits in year 2008 as a function of growth rate is
derived by linear regression analysis in Appendix 6.9-3. The Monte-Carlo analysis
estimates the probability distribution of these relative net benefits as a function of the
probability distribution of future growth.
Before we discuss the results of this analysis, note that any set of parameters could be
used, for instance cost of tunnel construction and economic opportunity cost of capital.
However, in our case the best expectation for these parameters is deterministic. And as
we argued in Section 4.1 the project ought to be optimized with respect to expected
values alone, i.e. we assume that risk is not a cost factor, which implies that considering
possible variance in these parameters is not warranted.
The situation is different in the case that variance is a cost factor, or, in other words, in the
case that the decision maker is risk averse: Then, as some variance is to be expected, it is
advisable to indicate a band of confidence, so that the cost due to risk can be calculated.
We suppose, for the purpose of illustration, that the decision maker's expectations with
respect to demand are best described by a normal distribution -0.5 skewed between 3%
and 30%. The expected net benefits for this expectation of the Transandino Alternative
Shuttle Option in the year 2008 relative to the status quo option is $-20 million and hence
the construction should not start by the end of this year. The result is displayed in
Appendix 6.9-4. For the statistically interested, or for those that are not convinced by my
case for risk neutrality in the evaluation of the project, some statistical data is displayed
"o5 In our model we use "Risk Master for Windows"; For a thorough explanation of Monte-Carlo Analysis
see S. Savvides "Risk Analysis in Investment Appraisal" Project Appraisal, Volume 9, Number 1, pages
3-18, March 1994; For the probability theory underlying the discussion any textbook will do, for instance
see Miller & Freund's "Probability & Statistics For Engineers" Fifth Edition, Prentice Hall.
'06 For simplicity we assume constant growth rates until 2007.
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numerically in Appendix 6.9-4 and diagrammatically in Appendix 6.9-5 and Appendix 6.9-
6.
The question, thougk remains whether one ought to expect a normal distribution -0.5
skewed between 3% and 30%. And that is the crucial question - we have developed an
analytic apparatus to, then, derive a justified decision. Note that talk about expectations is
here not confined to expectations about future demands but comprises, literally, any
assumption made in the model.
Let us consider, again, the choice among technological options. From the expectation
perspective a problem for our treatment of risk appears to arise: Our expectations
regarding the cost structure of a rail option are of higher quality than those of an
alternative shuttle option as many rail tunnels but no alternative shuttle tunnel have been
built and operated. In other words there is a lower variance of our expected rail costs as
compared to our expected alternative shuttle cost. We have argued in Section 1.4 for risk
neutrality with respect to deciding between the two options. It follows that the alternative
shuttle option should be chosen, as variance, then, is not an additional cost.
This conclusion, however, is prima facie at odds with the common sense principle that "if I
do not have much of an idea what is going to happen implementing an alternative shuttle
option I rather choose the rail option". Clearly, the common sense principle is reasonable.
So, if the common sense principle is at odds with our decision principle then this is a
strong argument against our decision principle. But is the antecedent true? I believe not:
I would rather say that the common sense principle says something about making a
decision between an option for which reasonable expectations exist and an option for
which reasonable expectations do not exist while our decision principle assumes that there
are reasonable expectations for both options. This line of reasoning would solve the
apparent tension between the two principles and leave our treatment of risk intact.
Unfortunately, a neat criterion for deciding which expectations are reasonable and which
are not does not suggest itself.
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In this light, then, it is arguable whether there are reasonable expectations about the
alternative shuttle options at all. Einstein (MIT) seriously questions the cost assumptions
of the alternative shuttle options in the model. It follows that the conclusion of the model
that the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option is the optimal technological choice ought
to be questioned. Note, however, that if the expectations are deemed reasonable and a
decision had to be made on the available information then the Transandino Alternative
Shuttle Option is the technology of choice.
6.10 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In the preceding section we have focussed on the implications of different demand
scenarios with respect to which technology and which timing of investment is optimal.
We have found that some of our other assumptions also might not qualify for the category
of reasonable expectations, which is required if one is to choose timing and technology on
expected values alone and ignore other scenarios. In this section we investigate into
assumptions in the model that satisfy the following two conditions:
1. It is arguable that the assumption is a reasonable expectation;
2. A plausible change in the assumption implies that a different
technological option or (substantially) different timing is optimal (and
so makes the latter likely).
We proceed by changing one assumption at a time keeping the remaining assumptions
constant. We determine the values for which the optimal technology changes, the critical
values, if they exist. The impacts of changes in the asssumptions on timing is less
revealing as we have no firm expectation on the development of future demand curves and
is therefore only considered in particular cases.
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The findings in this section ought to be interpreted as signals indicating the assumptions
that need to be questioned and further researched, i.e. assumptions satisfying conditions I
and 2 have a high priority for further research.
6.10.1 DISCOUNT RATE
The discount rate used appears to be well researched and corroborated by an independent
feasibility study. So condition 1 is not satisfied. Irrespectively, we proceed with a
sensitivity analysis as the effects of small changes in discount rates tend to be
extraordinarily large.
The choice among technological options is fairly robust with respect to changes in
discount rate: The optimal choice changes from the Transandino Alternative Shuttle
Option to the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Optionat at a discount rate of
approximately 15%. Reducing the discount rate has no impact on the optimality of the
Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option. Interestingly, although unsuprisingly, the
difference of net benefits among the traditional options decreases with decreasing discount
rate. The ordering, though, does only change for an unreasonable discount rate of 4%
(Transandino Rail Option, New Road Option, Train Shuttle Option).
Optimal timing is positively correlated with the discount rate: The higher the discount rate
the later should an investment option be implemented. The impacts of changes in the
discount rate, though, are not warranting a detailed quantitative exposition.
We conclude that more research into the correct opportunity cost of capital, the discount
rate, has a low priority.
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CAPACITY OF STATUS QUO OPTION
As remarked in Section 4.2.3 there is evidence at odds with our assumption that the Status
Quo Option has a capacity of 5000 vehicles per day. Thus, it satisfies condition 1. What
about condition 2?
The ordering of technological options is invariant to changes in capacity of the Status Quo
Option.
Timing on the other hand is significantly affected by changes in capacity. Assuming a
capacity of 2000 vehicles per day and a modest growth rate of demand (in demand
equivalents) for the next 15 years of 7% implies that it is optimal to start construction for
the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option in the year 2000 as compared to in the year
2009 at a capacity of 5000 vehicles per day. Considering the decision processes involved
this means that the project should be seriously pursued as of now. A proper investigation
into the capacity of the present link is, particularly considering the low costs of doing so,
clearly indicated. On the high side, assuming a capacity of 8000, implies a critical demand
equivalent of 2 million versus 1,6 million. The impact on timing is limited as the difference
constitutes an increase in demand equivalents of only 25%.
We conclude that more research into the capacity of the Status Quo Option is warranted.
6.10.3 VARIABLE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTIONS
As pointed out in Section 5.4.3 the costs of operation (mainly transportation park),
maintenance and safety but excluding time in the Alternative Shuttle Option appears to be
rather low at 5$ per transit for the shuttle portion of the transit (Prof. H. Einstein, MIT).
The same applies, consequently, to the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option. We
compare $5 in the Alternative Shuttle Option to $21 in the same category for the Train
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6.10.2
Shuttle Option and $46 in the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option to $202 in the
Transandino Rail Option. So condition 1 is satisfied.
We find that the Train Shuttle Option dominates the Transandino Alternative Shuttle
Option if the latter had a cost of $110, which is still a remarkably low 54% of the
comparable cost of the Transandino Rail Option. The Alternative Shuttle Option
dominates both options. So the optimal choice changes if the assumption is modified to a
plausible $110. This alone suffices to motivate further research into the operating costs of
the alternative shuttle options.
We find that the Train Shuttle Option dominates the Alternative Shuttle Option if the
latter had a cost of $45, which is 214% of the comparable cost of the Train Shuttle
Option.
Changes of optimal timing follow from the relative positions of the alternative shuttle
options to the Train Shuttle Option. The changes are substantial.
We concluce that research into operating costs and the costs of the transportation park
have a high priority for decision making.
6.10.4 OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS
In order to derive from the analysis conducted that the Transandino Alternative Shuttle
Option is the optimal option it has to be assumed that the technological options considered
are the best available. It is, however, arguable that this assumption is reasonable. So
condition 1 is satisfied. A plausible change of the assumption would be to say that it is
likely "that the technological options considered are not the best available". It follows,
conceptually, that it is likely that a different technological option (precisely the new one)
or different timing is optimal. So condition 2 is satisfied and, hence, searching for new,
innovative, technological options has a high priority.
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The crucial assumption in the above argument leading to the conclusion that considerable
effort should be expended on the search for new, innovative solutions is that it is plausible
that better technological options could be found. I will argue for this assumption by
offering two ideas that are to be expected to lead to an improvement. Prof. H. Einstein
(MIT) claims that a gradient of 5% for the rail tunnel is very likely to be suboptimal.
Tunnels in Switzerland have a maximum of 2.5%. Secondly, and more generally, it is not
to be expected that the process employed in E.F. "' First determine the technological
parameters of road, rail and alternative shuttle options by an engineering company and
then conduct the economic evaluation (no iteration)" leads to an optimal technological
choice from the economic perspective. It is to be expected that an iterative process yields
a better result. The latter was refered to in Section 1.1 as a dynamic approach to project
evaluation and juxtaposed to the former as the static approach to project evaluation. The
design and evaluation process of the tunnel project is to be regarded in the phase where
the findings of the economic evaluation ought to be used to create new technological
options. The model here developed may serve as a feedback for the engineering side.
We conclude that research into new technological options is a high priority.
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
7.1 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 3-6
In Part II of the thesis we have applied the evaluational framework developed in Part I to
the Mendoza-Los Andes transportation corridor project. (Part I of the thesis is
summarized at the end of Chapter 2)
In Chapter 3 we investigated the potential for benefits of an improvement of the Mendoza-
Los Andes transportation corridor. We found strong evidence of the importance of the
Mendoza-Los Andes transportation corridor for regional economic development:
Demand is expected to increase as a consequence of the following factors:
1. The Mendoza-Los Andes corridor is the direct terrestrial connection
between the economic centres of Buenos Aires/Montevideo on the
Atlantic side and Santiago on the Pacific side. (In 1994 all freight and
93.3% of passenger transits between Chile and Argentina used the
Mendoza-Los Andes corridor.)
2. As Chile has joined Mercosur, trade barriers are falling and increases in
trade between Argentina/Brasil/Uruguay/Paraguay and Chile, and
consequently demand for the Mendoza-Los Andes corridor, are to be
expected;
3. In the light of global trade liberalization, demand for the Mendoza-Los
Andes corridor is expected to fiurther increase as a consequence of
increases of the following trade flows: Chile - Brasil, Chile - Europe,
Argentina/Brasil/Uruguay/Paraguay - Pacific Rim and bi-oceanic trade
(as a substitute of the Panama canal).
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CHAPTER 7:
There is evidence that the existing transportation link (supply) is inadequate:
1. The Mendoza-Los Andes corridor is unreliable: Historically it has been
closed for an average of 30 days during the winter due to severe
weather conditions;
2. Congestion occurs during peak periods during the summer;
3. The current safety standard is considered to be too low.
It follows that there is a potential danger for the Mendoza-Los Andes corridor to develop
into a transportation bottleneck that has strong and negative implications for regional
development. Particular care in the improvement of the corridor is indicated as substantial
improvements have been found to require as much as 19 years'0 7 for implementation.
In the following chapters, Chapter 4-6, we developed a model of the Mendoza-Los Andes
transportation corridor that indicates the optimal technological option and optimal timing
for an improvement of the corridor.
We considered six technological options:
1. Status Quo Option - transits'" via existing road;
2. New Road Option - transits via low altitude road tunnel;
3. Train Shuttle Option - transits via road to low altitude tunnel and via
train shuttle through low altitude tunnel;
4. Alternative Shuttle Option - transits via road to low altitude tunnel and
via an alternative shuttle system through low altitude tunnel;
107 See Section 4.3.2.
10s A transit is a trip from Mendoza to.Los Andes or vice versa.
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5. Transandino Rail Option - transits by train shuttle through low altitude
tunnel;
6. Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option - transits by alternative shuttle
system through low altitude tunnel.
The model, then, calculates costs and benefits of the operation of one year of the
Mendoza-Los Andes Corridor for each of the above technological options for a given
demand (or more precisely demand curve). It calculates the net benefits for each
technological option as a function of demand: The cost structure of the technological
option is determined; Net benefits is, then, the difference between the benefits as
determined by the demand curve and total cost as determined by the cost structure,
assuming that the link is priced (economically) efficiently.
In order to compare the investment options (options 2-6) to the Status Quo Option, which
is the natural base case option, the model calculates net benefits for each technological
option relative to the Status Quo by subtracting the former from the latter.
The optimal time to start operating an investment option, then, is the year when the
demand curve occurs for which net benefits relative to the Status Quo Option is positive.
Construction should start, accordingly, earlier. Such an investment option will be superior
to the Status Quo Option from that point in time onwards as demand is to be expected to
increase through time.
We choose among investment options by considering which one has the largest net
benefits relative to the Status Quo over the demand range (200,000 to 4,000,000 transits
per year) considered.
In order to be able to determine the optimal timing of investment the model calculates in
which year which demand is to occur based on scenarios of demand development.
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These, then, are the optimal technology and the optimal timing of investment as
determined by the model:
The optimal technological option is the Transandino Alternative Shuttle Option.
The optimal start for construction is in the year 2029, 2008, 1998, 1989 or 1996
depending on whether the annual growth rate is projected to be, respectively, 3%, 7%,
12%, 30% or 15% until year 2005, then 7%. The results are depicted in Figure 7. In
Chapter 5 we found evidence for each of these demand projections. It follows that an
unambiguous conclusion with respect to the optimal timing of investment cannot be drawn
from the analysis conducted.
We will find, however, in the following, and final, two sections that these results should
not be regarded as the main conclusion to draw from the analysis conducted.
7.2 COMPARISON TO RESULTS OF FEASIBILITY STUDY (E.F.)
In this section we compare the methodology and results of the analysis conducted in this
thesis to that of the feasibility study comissioned by the Argentinean and Chilean
governments (E.F.).
While much of the data used in the thesis is taken from E.F. a substantial difference in the
method of analysis exists: In E.F. the benefits of an investment option is defined to be the
reduction in transportation costs relative to the status quo. The costs of an investment
option are defined as the difference in investment costs, operation costs and maintenance
costs between the investment option and the status quo. The benfits and costs are
projected to the year 2045, based on three demand scenarios, and the net present value is
calculated to determine the optimal technological option. In the thesis, on the other hand,
the benefits of all options are defined to be the area under the demand curve, the costs of
all options are the respective sums of investment costs, operations costs and maintenance
costs and the benefits and costs are compared for one year.
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FIGURE 7: OPTIMAL START FOR CONSTRUCTION AS A FUNCTION OF FUTURE ANNUAL TRAFFIC
GROWTH RATE
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The phenomenon that demand is a function of level of service, which is captured in our
model by economic pricing, is incorporated in E.F. by adjusting the demand forecasts to
whether the investment option is in place or not so.
E.F. uses an intricate origin-destination model based on perceived travel costs to forecast
traffic flows through the Mendoza-Los Andes corridor.
E.F. only considers the New Road Option and the Train Shuttle Option.
The result of E.F. is that the optimal option is the Train Shuttle Option and that
construction should begin in the year 2003. With respect to technological choice this
result is consistent with the findings of our model. The timing of investment is more
difficult to compare as different methods of forecasting are used in both models.
However, the "most plausible" future annual growth rate underlying the origin-destination
model is in the region of 7%. At a future annual growth rate of 7% our model calculates
that construction for the Train Shuttle Option optimally begins in the year 2007. So the
two results are remarkably close.
What are the conclusions to draw from this fact?
Generally, conclusions are corroborated if arrived by two conceptually different methods.
It follows that the conclusion that it is efficient to begin construction for a rail tunnel
between the year 2004 and the year 2007 is justified. This, however, does not imply that
the right course of action is to wait until the year 2004 and then start construction.
Rather, considering that there are good grounds that construction for an available
technological option ought to start in only 8 years, there is an urgency to find better
technological options: On the one hand, available technology is indicated to be efficient
soon; On the other hand there are good grounds that better technology can be found.
This brings us to the second conclusion to draw from the fact that the results of E.F. and
of our model are close.
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Generally, the fact that one method yields results that are consistent with another,
conceptualy not equivalent, method, corroborates the validity of both methods. In
particular, it follows that our model is corroborated. Now, we have applied our model to
options not considered in the economic feasibility study of E.F. (though presented in
E.F.T, i.e. Estudio Factibilidad Tecnologico). We have found that the Train Shuttle
Option is dominated by both, the Alternative Shuttle Option and the Transandino
Alternative Shuttle Option. As there is now reason to believe that our model is largely
plausible, it follows that such, novel, technological options should be further researched.
We conclude that both, the optimal start for construction for the rail tunnel in the year
2004 and the likely availability of superior technology, strongly suggest intensive research
into the optimal technological design of the Mendoza-Los Andes transportation corridor.
In the following, final, section we will make suggestions in that regard.
7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In our model of the Mendoza-Los Andes transportation corridor we substantially
abstracted from reality. We argued that for this stage in the evaluation and design of the
project the simplifying assumptions in place are sufficiently realistic. In the course of the
discussion and in particular in the sensitivity analysis we noted which assumptions merit
particular attention.
We can distinguish between assumptions in the calculation of benefits, assumptions in the
calculation of costs and modelling assumptions made to design the overall analytic
framework.
On the cost side, the following areas are promising for improving the model:
1. The variable cost assumptions for both alternative shuttle options
appear to be too low and, thus, ought to be considered;
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2. The assumption on train operation, that supply of locomotives can be
increased continuously with demand, should be dropped;
3. The sizable difference between investment costs of a road tunnel ($4. I1
billion) and investment costs of a rail tunnel ($1.2 billion) ought to be
investigated;
4. Safety costs should not only include costs due to fatalities but also
personal injuries and damage to material;
5. The routing of the rail option with a gradient of 5% is likely to be
suboptimal (according to Prof. H. Einstein, MIT) and, thus, alternative
routes should be investigated;
6. The assumption of risk neutrality of the decision maker should be
questioned by determining the appropriate risk attitude;
7. Financial values used should be replaced by economic values (in
particular construction costs);
8. Environmental impacts ought to be incorporated;
9. The capacity of the current link should be investigated,
10. A distributive analysis ought to be conducted;
11. Reliability of the link should be included as a cost in the model.
On the benefits side it is strongly indicated to improve the demand forecasts as we have
found that small changes in future annual growth rates have a large impact on the optimal
timing of an investment. Furthermore, the effects of a rail connection between Mendoza
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and Los Andes on demand should be investigated. At the minimum, the actual quantity of
transits in the future ought to be observed and analyzed.
We found that the assumptions underlying the analytic framework are well justified. In the
face of the current trend of private infrastructure provision, though, it might be warranted
to question the assumption of efficient pricing.
The above, then, is a list of suggestions on how to improve the model and the
technological options considered.
However, attention should not be limited to these points. Rather, based on our model, a
dynamic process between technological design and economic evaluation should take place:
New technological options should be designed, evaluated, re-designed, re-evaluated and
so forth. One concrete proposal is to investigate the option of combining an alternative
shuttle operation with a through rail link, as is done in the Channel tunnel between
England and France.
It is suggested that on a yearly basis, the improved expectations with respect to demand
and the expectations with respect to the improved technological options should be fed into
the improved model to decide whether it is efficient to start construction in that year. This
way the investment decision is based on the best information available. The model we
have developed is particularly well suited for this process as it determines the demand for
which an investment option is efficient, and thus, to make an investment choice, demand
only has to be forecasted until the start of operation.
Clearly, this process is not costless. But failure to do so is likely to be costlier considering
projected construction periods of 11 years for a rail or shuttle tunnel and of 19 years for a
road tunnel and the opportunity costs involved. Drastically put: Once congestion is
painful the economically optimal start for the investment is likely to have been missed
already.
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A final word: We have found that there is good evidence that the low altitude tunnel is a
sensible project and that construction should begin in the near future. The Mendoza-Los
Andes transportation corridor project has passed the economic sanity check. It is
therefore recommended to conduct the design and evaluation process with high intensity.
This project has the potential for substantial development impact in South America,
physically linking together the Mercosur nations as never before. We hope this analysis
helps guide the way towards deployment of this important infrastructure program.
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accidentes en la montaiia
Los vientos arrasaron Ia zona de alta montaria y de Malargiie: hicieron ivolcar la
carga de dos carniones en Uspallata y en el departamento suretio unas quince vi-
viendas perdieron sus techos. El gobierno municipal ayudard a los damnificados.
FOTO (OS ANDS
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APPENDIX 4.1: GENERAL REMARKS - PARAMETERS APPLICABLE TO ALL OPTIONS
discount rate 0.12
ecoromic opporinty cost of constucton I (conversion factor)
economic opporlnty cost of equipment 1 (conversion factor)
operation cost of average vehicle on road as a function of topography and vehcte type mix




cost of vehicle operation on pavement as a function of topography and vehicle type (ncl. time, ifu, maintenance)(E.F.D.303)
Am car bus tuck average vehcle
flat 0.27 0.93 0.61 0.4687
l,ý 0.34 1.36 0.87 0.6471
mountainuous 0.4 1.83 1.4 0.9102
cost of road mainenance (per kmn) 2500 (Stvear) (E.F.DP.359)
cost of snow removal (per kn) 2500 (S4year) (E.F.DP 359)
cost of time as a function of vehicle type (E.F.D.301, estimaed ornom dlrewnces in cost per Am at dlfibrnlt speeds)
car bus tuck average velde
S hr 15 120 20 31.25
cost of r-routing in splnglasummer: transit mendoza -bc ennde vie peso pehuenche (Mr. Boeer, Geoconsult E.F.DP.20, Road Map Argenuna, J.P.K Maps, 1991, First Editn,
operations of va e kman $Am Gran Map Tulstico lunpal, Carlografla Tunsmo)
flat 753 0.4678 36522534
thy 81 0.6471 52.4151
mountanous 167 0.9102 152.0034
oprsllons cost per transt 556 6719
sfety cost 25.025
erMronmemt cost 0
average total cost per ranst 581.6
cost of re-routng in winter: transit mendue - los endes via peso puyehue (Mr. Boeer, Geoconsult Road Map Argentina, J P. K. Maps, 1991, First Edion, Gan Map Tuistico lunpel,
operations of vehicle kmn n $ Certogratle Tunamo)
flat 2197 0.4678 1027.757
lly 91 0.6471 58.8861
mournarnuous 100 0.9102 91.02
cost per tansit 1177663
safety cost 59.7
armrornental cost 0











































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX 4.3.2: NEW ROAD OPTION - FIXED COST
CAPITAL COST
ddscount rate
table of cashflow (E.F.T.281)
year
expenditures end of year (nflon $)
valu end of year 19






road to be maintained




1 2 3 4 5 6
21.69 21.69 21.69 2169 9.19 9.19
166.7954 148.9244 132.9682 118.7216 4491256 40.1005
4180.946 (rmllon$)
5.02E+08 (S/year)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
0 293.23 112.75 11275 112.75 11275 112.75 11275 11399 11399 11399 195 04
0 1020.015 3501844 312.6646 279.1648 2492543 2225485 198.704 1793655 1601477 1429891 2184448







APPENDIX 4.3.3: NEW ROAD OPTION - VARIABLE COST
cost per nanslt - operallon of vehicle (E F.DP. 191091)
km $mn $
fiat 45 0.4678 21 051
hly 47 0.6471 30.4137
mou•takruous 167 0.9102 152.0034
cost of safety 6.475
cost of eirironynent





0.309041 (rnsnalt) (E.F.T 272)
210.2521 (Stanslt)
APPENDIX 4.3.4 : NEW ROAD OPTION -SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
COST PER YEAR
ransits per year





average fixed cost per trnsit
average variable cost per ansit
average total cost per tansit
























































































































































































APPENDIX 4.4.2: TRAIN SHUTTLE OPTION -FIXED COST
CAPITAL COST
discount rate
table of cashflows (E.F. T. 305)
year
experndues end of year (milon 5)
vaue end of year 11
vakem of ependitures begining of opera
capital coat
MAINTENANCE COST
maintenance of unnel & rail
toad melnlenance (E.F.DP. I 9O300)
km
road to be maintained




1 2 3 4
12.9 12.9 104 104
40.06544 35.77272 25.75002 2299109
1210.601 (rilonS)
5 6 7 8 9 10
0 148.16 89.23 89.23 14333 178.94
0 261.1085 140.4051 1253617 179.7932 2004128
1.458E08 (S$year)







APPENDIX 4.4.3: TRAIN 8HUTTLE OPTION -VARIABLE COST
ROAD PORTION










cost operakon, maintenance and selely






cost of Ume obr shuie
tim for oadng and unloadng on shutle
travel Sme
waling lime
total tip time for rail porton
ime cost













0.12 (for calctlaton of yearly cost of tanaportason pari, tentavve)
7800 (S"year) (E F.T.305) (capacity for 10000 velNies per day)
0000 (/year) (EF.T 272 (for 10000 ranslts per day)
7800 ($/year) for 10000 veacles per day



























































































































































































APPENDIX 4.5.2 : ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTION - FIXED COST
CAPITAL COST
discount rate 0.12
table ofcashflows (E.F. T.307)
year 1 2
expenditures and of year (mllon $) 896 896
vakLe end of year 11 27.8284 24.84679 15




road maintenance (E F DP. 190360)
road to be maintained
















5 6 7 8 9 10
0 125.84 83.24 83.23 115.58 154.88
0 221.7731 130.9798 116.9322 144.9836 173.4656







APPENDIX 4.5.3 : ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTION -VARIABLE COST
ROAD PORTION
cost per transit - opemakon of vehicle (E.F.DP. 19019 1)
lan $Ar $
flat 18 0.4678 8.4204
hily 47 0.6471 30.4137
mounlainuous 167 0.9102 152.0034
cost of safety 5.8
cost of ernvronment 0
cost per tanlsit 196.6375
SHUTTLE PORTION
dlcount rate 0. 12 (for caIlculaon of yearty cost of transportallon park, tentatve)
cost operalion, mainlenance and safelty






cosl of ime fobr shum
lma for Ioading and unloadng on shutle
tavel time
waln ime
total trip Ime for rail portlion
lme cost















(E.F.T.306) (capital cost per year)
(E.FT.272)
(pro rate to 10000 vehcies (capacity) ' 360 (days))
(E.F.T.207)
(E.F.T.221)





























































































































































































APPENDIX 4.6.2: THE TRANSANDINO RAIL OPTION - FIXED COST
CAPITAL COST
discount rate
assumpton Investment in Infrastructure as in rail shuttle option + tracks mendoza -punts del inca, juncal - los andes
tack same dstance as roads, investment spread during last 4 years
cost of irack 7000000 ($Sm) (hemnan koehne bauuntemrn rung gribh)
able ofceshflows (E.F. T.305)
year (mrNons of $)
expenitures as rail shutil option
exta expenditure for tadck
total expendture (and of year)
value end of year 11
value of expenitures beginning of operations
capital cost
MAINTENANCE COST
maintenance cost of exa tarack
maintenance of tunnal & rail





12.9 12.9 10.4 10.4
40.06544 356.77272 25.75002 22.99109
3151.008 (rnlon$)
3.79E+08 ($/year)
5 6 7 8
0 148.16 89.23 89.23
406
0 148.16 89.23 495.23





















APPENDIX 4.6.3 : THE TRANSANDINO RAIL OPTION -VARIABLE COST
discount rate 0.12 (for calculation of yearly cost of transportation park, tentative)
assumption: electricity cons•up on & iransportaion park pro rate extapolated from 23 kmn (rail slut option) to 255 kmn operation (elecncity severely overstated - flat
vs. mountainuous terrain)
cot operation, mainlnaence end saelty






cost of ltme fobr shuffe
time for loadng and unloading on shulte
iravel time
walting isme















(E.F.T.305) (capacity for 10000 vethcles per day)
(E.F T.272 (for 10000 transts per day)
for 10000 vehicles per day
(dvide by 360 - 10000)
(E.F.T.183)
(255 km at 100 krAr average)
(not dear from Information)
APPENDIX 4.6.4 : THE TRANSANDINO RAIL OPTION - SYNTHESIS OF COSTS
COST PER YEAR
transts per year








ansits per year 200000
average fixed cost per tansit 1904.3
average variable cost per transit 298 1895
average total cost per trnslt 2202.489
marginal cost (extra 200000) 298.1895
linear approximalion of marginal coat curve
slope
yknfcept










































































































































































APPENDIX 4.7.2: THE TRANSANOINO ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTION - FIXED COST
CAPITAL COST
discount rate
asssumpon: Investment in Infrastructure as In altemaltve shutle option + tacks mendoza -punts del inca, uncal - os andes
track same distance as roads, investment spread during last 4 years
cost of track 7000000 (S•m) (same as rail)
table ofcashflows (EF. T.307)
year
expendiures end of year (imnlon $)
extr expendire for track
total expendire (and of year)
value end of year 11
value of expenites beinnlng of operatons
capital cost
MAINTENANCE COST
maintenance cost of exta tack
mantenance of lunel per year
mantenance cost of extra tacks
total maintenance cost
TOTAL FIXED COST
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8.96 8.96 6.46 6.46 0 125.84 83.24 83.23
406
8.96 8.96 6.46 6.46 0 125.84 83.24 489.23








(E.F.T.272) (only "maintenance of Instalaton" fixed - rest variable)
APPENDIX 4.7.3: THE TRANSANDINO ALTERNATIVE SHUTTLE OPTION - VARIABLE COST
discount rate 0. 12 (for calculallon of yearty cost of tansportaion park, teMntave)
assunplon: electicity consumption & transporlation park pro rate exrapolated from 23 km (rail shutle option) to 255 km operatlon (eleclricty severely overstated -flat
vs. mountanous tenain)
cost operaeon, maintenance and sality






cost of tne br shule
Sne for loadng and unoading on shutMe
tavel ame
waling Sne















(E F.T. 305) (capacity for 10000 vehicles per day)
(E.F.T.272 (for 10000 tranlts per day)
for 10000 veNhcles per day
(divde by 360 10000)
(E.F.T207)
(255 km at 100 krnr average)
























































































































































































APPENDIX 4. : COMPARISON OF AVERAGE TOTAL COSTS
average lo4al cost per option as a function of quantity of transits ($ranslf)
tansits per year 200000 400000 600000 800000
stakusquooplon 263.3161 2610599 2603078 2599317
new road oplon 2734.577 1472415 1051.694 841.3334
Iran Otu lloplon 98132 615.2049 493.1665 432.1473
alarrnlve stAle opton 8397544 5288924 4252718 373.4614
transindnorad oplon 2202489 1250339 932.9561 774.2644












































331.7408 357.8906 385 5665
4397362 420,6126 404431
315.6561 3101089 3054151




















































APPENDIX 5.2-1: SHAPE OF DEMAND CURVE

















quan•lty of tuck transtt
0 35 (SAum)
90.65 9065 9065 90.65
0 20 40 60
90.65 11065 13065 150.65































317.275 317.275 317.275 317.275
300 400 600 800
617.275 717,275 917275 1117.275
72118 57962 31920 16731
278.425 278.425 278.425 278.425
300 400 600 800
578.425 678.425 878.425 1078,425
178762 148363 96662 62395
synlhesizing demand curves into demand curve of average vehicle (Warenled as proportions sufm enlty slmiler)




average vehcle perceived operating cost 069725 ($S4m)
operalons 180.5878 180.5878 180.5878 180.5878 180.5878 180.5878 180.5878
MoI ($Svendce) 0 56 89.5 123 179 246 352.5
total ($Selcle) 180.5878 236 5878 270.0878 303.5878 359.5878 426.5878 533.0878
quanity of veNces 829877 785798 749209 705351 631779 506398 362453
inear approxmation of reprsentallve demand curve
slope -0.00072
y-ntercept 797.5621
APPENDIX 5.2-2: CORRELATING TIME AND DEMAND CURVES
DEMAND CURVE PROJECTIONS: YEAR OF ACTUALIZATION OF DEMAND CURVE IN FIVE SCENARIOS
we consider the set of demand curves of thie for mx + n defined by
m = rb -000072
n such hat the x-coordinate of the intersection wtlh y = 277 is a
muiple of 200000 (Ihs way a smilar form to "quanity of transits" Is usable)





mercosur - european comnunity analogy
mercosur trade analogy





















































54242665 95594110 1 68E+08
14669673 20574976 28857468
5.15E+10 1.91E+11 7.1E+11
APPENDIX 5.2-3: CORRELATING CHILE - ARGENTINA TRADE AND TRANSITS IN THE MENDOZA - LOS ANDES CORRIDOR
absoklue values 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
trade value (nmlS) 574 869 1227 1298 966 (E.F DP.32/34 mports + exports (argenlnean perspectve); note date Inconsstent w•th E F DPL22(20
transts 232763 284851 262783 268101 295175 (E.F.DP.44; note data Inconastaen wt E.F.DP 193) (ctvlean perspecUve))
growth rale
rade value 0.513937 0.411968 0.057865 -025578
transts 0223781 -007747 0.020237 0.100984













APPENDIX 6: SYNTHESIS OF BENEFITS AND COSTS - NET BENEFITS
APPENDIX 6.1 : ON CALCULATIONS
we keep the shape of te demand curve constant (Ine) at
mb' -0.00072 (see 3)
famloy of demand curves defined uniquely by demand equlvalents
"mb'* x -mb * q + 277" (q = demand equvaents)
then, goss benefits Is defined to be ie area between the mb curve and tie x - axis between 0
and te x coordinate of the point of Intersecton of mc and mb;
we stift ie demand curve a.t. at mc * 277 (SrNeicie) the Intersectons of mb curves and mc = 277
are 200000 (ransits) apart;
then solve mc(q)= rmb(q) for q' for each option wIth each demand curve
then gross benefits as a fuclon of a given dmand curve Is
gb(q')= 0.5"mt"gA2 - mb"q'q' + 277"q' (derivaton fairly straghforward)
APPENDIX 8.2: STATUS QUO OPTION - NET BENEFITS
Mnear approxima•on of marginal cost curve
stope
y-Intercept
linear approximeaon of dotal cost curve
slope py-nfarcept
definiton of mb curves














































6 63E+08 7.49E+08 8 34E+08






2800000 3000000 3200000 3400000 3600000 3800000 4000000
2415289 2578503 2741718 2904932 3068147 3231361 3394576
3 42E+09 3.87E+09 4 35E+09 4 86E+09 5 39E+09 5 95E+09 6 54E+09
1E+09 1 09E+09 1 17E+09 1 26E+09 1.35E+09 1 43E+09 1 52E+09
2.42E+09 2 78E+09 3 18E+09 3 6E+09 4 04E+09 4 52E+09 5.02E+09
APPENDIX 6.3: NEW ROAD OPTION - NET BENEFITS
inear approxlmalon of marginal cost curve
lope
y-intercept
lneer approxlmalon of Jobl cost curve
syope
y-4nlrcept
1800000 2000000 2200000 2400000 2600000 2800000 3000000
1893221 2093221 2293221 2493221 2693221 2893221 3093221
1.68E+09 201E.09 2 36E+09 2.75E+09 3.16E609 361E+09 4.08E+09
903E+08 945E+08 9.87E+08 1.03E+09 107E+09 1 11E.09 1 16E+09






3400000 3600000 3800000 4000000
3493221 3693221 3893221 4093221
5 1E+09 5 66E+09 6 24E+09 6 86E*09
1 24E+09 1 28E+09 1 32E+09 1 37E+09
3 86E+09 4 38E+09 4 92E+09 5 49E+09
defirtion of mb curves

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX 6.8-2 : COMPARISON NET BENEFITS
-X- status quo option
-- new road option
- - - - - -rail shuttle option
--- alternative shuttle option
----- transandino rail option
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Range: o0.m3 0.112 02
Standard deviation: 0.045
Degree of skewness: -50%
169
I I
I I I r
1
I
(isk Variable No. 1
APPENDIX 0.9-3: DERIVING NET BENEFITS RELATIVE TO STATUS QUO OPTION IN 2000 AS A FUNCTION OF GROWTH RATES
growh rate for next 11 yers 0.135
net benetll of transandino alrmnative shuffle option relative to Status Quo Option as a function of demand equivalents
demand equlvaent 200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000 1200000 1400000 1600000 1800000 2000000 2200000 2400000 2600000 2800000 3000000 3200000 3400000 3600000 3800000 4000000
trnsadno altmatve shutle -4.9E+08 -4.2E+08 -3.6E+08 -2.9E+08 -2.1E+08 -1.4E+08 -7E+07 4146521 79030240 1.55E+08 2.32E+08 3.09E+08 3.88E+08 468E+08 5.49E+08 6.3E+08 7 13E+08 797E+08 881E+08 967E+08
option net benefits relaive to
status quo opton
k•ier approximation of not benefts of iransandino alletneave shufUe option reatirve to Status Quo Option as a function of demand equivalets
slope 384.1076
y4r"ncept -6E+08
deanend equivalent in year 2008 as a function of (constanQ growth rts
we assurne gowth rate from 1994 to 1996 * 10%, I.e demand equivalents n 1996 = 357352
gowth rate 0.03 005 0.07 009 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 021 0.23 0.25 027 0.29
denandequlvalentln2008 494658.7 611193.2 752173.1 922120.5 1126287 1370753 1662541 2009744 2421658 2908944 3483794 4160125 4953785 5882786
ineer approximation of demand equivalent In year 2008 as a function of (conslant growMh rats
slope 19651719
yntecpt -804235
net benefit. as a funtion of gowth rates (subsututing fmnnule)
net benefits 1.13E+08
0,
APPENDIX 6.9-4: MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS RESULTS: PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION OF RELATIVE NET BENEFITS AS A







Coefficient of variation -14.923
Probability of negative outcome 57.2%
Expected loss 134892854.7
Expected gain 113997111.8
Expected loss ratio 0.542
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APPENDIX 6.9-5: MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS RESULTS: FREQUENCY
DISTRIBUTION OF RELATIVE NET BENEFITS AS A
FUNCTION OF GROWTH RATE PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION
NET BENEFITS AS A FUNTION OF GROWTH RATE PROBABIUTY DISTRIBUTION


















-6: MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS RESULTS: CUMULATIVE
DISTRIBUTION OF RELATIVE NET BENEFITS AS A
FUNCTION OF GROWTH RATE PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION
NET BENEFITS AS A FUNTION OF GROWTH RATE PROBABUITY DISTRIBUTION
-400000000 4a00000000 -400000000 -200000000 0 200000000 4 0 00000000 00 800000000 1000000000 1200000000
173
